Wednesday, September 3, 2014

06/05/2003 Crazy Horse *

While the stock market rally has been impressive, financial markets are generally demonstrating increasingly unsound dynamics.  This week saw “convulsions” in the U.S. stock market, as well as in the Credit, currency and gold markets.  The equity upswing this week was led again by the speculative Biotechs and Broker/Dealers.  The Dow added 2.4% for the week and the S&P500 gained 2.5%.  Both the Transports and Utilities were relatively flat for the week, losing less than half a percent each.  The Morgan Stanley Cyclicals added approximately 4% for the second week in a row while the Consumer Index gained 2.3%.  The broader market remains strong, with today’s small decline ending the Russell 2000’s winning streak at twelve sessions.  The small cap Russell 2000 gained almost 3% for the week and is up 32.3% from March lows.  The S&P 400 Midcap index was up 2.0% for the week and has returned 26.8% since March lows.  With this week’s 1% gain, the NASDAQ 100 is up 23.2% y-t-d.  The Morgan Stanley High Tech index added 2%, increasing y-t-d gains to 29.8%.  The Semiconductors gained 1.5%, with 2003 gains of 34.2%.  The Street.com Internet and NASDAQ Telecom indices added 2%, increasing y-t-d gains to 43% and 33%.  The Biotechs jumped 7.5%, increasing 2003 gains to about 43%.  The financial sector was strong again this week, with the Banks gaining 4.4% and Broker/Dealers adding 5.8%.  The Broker/Dealers were up 16% in the past nine sessions.  Although volatile bullion retreated $1.10 this week, the resilient HUI Gold index added 3.5%.

The Credit market remains unsettled in “melt-up” dynamics.  Two-year Treasury yields declined eight basis points to 1.24%, trading this week to 52-year lows.  Five-year yields dipped two basis points to 2.27%.  Ten-year Treasury yields dipped two basis points to 3.35%, while the long-bond saw its yield increase two basis points to end the week at 4.40%.  Benchmark Mortgage-backs and agency futures generally performed in line with Treasuries.  The 10-year dollar swap spread narrowed 2.5 to 33, while the spread on Fannie’s 4 3/8% 2013 note narrowed 6 to 29.  Corporate spreads were generally somewhat tighter, with junk bonds recovering some of their recent underperformance.  Currencies seemingly become more volatile by the week, although the dollar index ended the week with a slight gain.  The Canadian dollar traded at a six-year high against the dollar.  With crude oil trading at a 2 ½ month high, the CRB index gained about 1%.

While remaining quite strong, corporate debt issuance was down marginally from recent weeks. Daimlerchrysler issued $2.5 billion (re-priced up 30 basis points to 179 over Treasuries after news of large losses), Wells Fargo $2.5 billion, Target $500 million, Greenpoint Financial $350 million, MBNA $300 million, Verizon $500 million, Union Pacific $500 million, Praxair $300 million, and MBIA $150 million.  One week of convertible bond issuance has already surpassed the volume from the entire month of June 2002.  Converts this week included Schlumberger’s $1.3 billion, Nabors Industries (raised $700 million of zero coupon 20-year convertible debt), Omnicom $550 million, Western Wireless $100 million, FLIR System $150 million, Lincare $250 million, and Continental Air $150 million (up from $100 million).  Alcatel sold EUR 1 billion of converts with a 4.75% coupon, with other major technology companies such as Ericsson looking to similarly take advantage of market conditions.  

After two weeks of slight outflows, AMG reported $1.45 billion of inflows into junk bond funds last week.  These were the strongest flows since February.   This week’s issuance included SPX Corp. $300 million, Warnaco $210 million, Esterline Tech $175 million, Sequa $100 million, Waterford Gaming $155 million, United Component $230 million, Burns Philp $100 million, Premcor Refining $300 million, Houston Exploration $175 million, and Texas-New Mexico Power $250 million.  Williams Co. raised its junk issuance from $500 million to $800 million, with a spread to Treasuries of 573 basis points.

The state of Illinois’s $10 billion issue was the largest ever taxable municipal deal.

June 6 – Bloomberg:  “The Philippine dollar bonds due in 2009 strengthened to a record after the central bank yesterday cut interest rates it pays banks on some funds and lifted restrictions on forward trading of the peso. The difference in yield between the 2009 bond, with an 8 3/8 percent coupon, and U.S. Treasuries of similar maturity narrowed to 3.81 percentage points… That’s the smallest premium since the bonds were sold in March last year…the yield fell to (a record low) 6.004 percent from 6.374.”

June 6 – Bloomberg:  “Russia’s Eurobonds advanced after the country’s foreign currency and gold reserves surged to a record $64.7 billion… Russia’s 2018 dollar bond climbed 1.25 cents in the dollar to a record 146.25 cents, cutting the yield to 6.23 percent… The yield has dropped from 8.53 percent in the past six months… Russia’s reserves are soaring on rising oil-led export receipts, bolstering confidence the country’s economy can withstand any drop in crude prices… Foreign reserves rose $1.6 billion in the week ending May 30, from $63.1 billion… The reserves have risen $17 billion this year.”
   
 June 3 – Dow Jones (Mike Esterl):  “Mexico issued a EUR750 million bond Tuesday, tapping a European investor base that's warming up again to Latin America but increasingly skittish about holding dollars. The 10-year security, which will pay an annual interest rate of 5.375% in London, is the first euro-denominated debt issuance by a Latin American country since Brazil placed EUR500 million in April of last year.”
Broad money supply (M3) expanded $13.4 billion last week.  Demand and Checkable Deposits gained $5.8 billion.  Savings Deposits were about unchanged, while Small Denominated Deposits declined $1.8 billion.  Retail Money Fund deposits added $2.3 billion and Institutional Money Fund deposits increased $5.6 billion.  Repurchase Agreements declined $0.6 billion and Eurodollars added $1.9 billion.  Elsewhere, Commercial Paper increased $10.8 billion to $1.36 Trillion, the highest level since the first week of December.  Financial CP jumped $13.2 billion (up $57.5 billion in six weeks) to $1.224 Trillion.  This is the highest level of financial sector CP borrowings since December 2001.  Total Bank Assets jumped $47.4 billion last week, with six-week gains of $196 billion.  Securities holdings increased $20 billion to $1.84 Trillion, with Securities up 19% y-o-y.  Loans and Leases added $2.5 billion.  Commercial and Industrial loans declined $1.2 billion and Real Estate loans dipped $6.2 billion.  Security loans increased $4.1 billion.  About $8 billion of ABS was issued this week.  Fed “custody” “Foreign Holdings of U.S. Debt” increased $5.62 billion this week.  

June 4 – Bloomberg:  “Bank of America Corp., the biggest U.S. lender to individuals and companies, said demand for its commercial loans is accelerating, a sign of faster economic growth.   The recovery ‘has got to come from the medium- and small-sized businesses who start to invest, start to build inventory, start to buy some technology and hire some of their people back,’ said bank Chief Financial Officer James Hance… ‘And all of that’s beginning.’   Commercial lending by Charlotte, North Carolina-based Bank of America was at the highest level in 15 months in April, Hance said. The bank forecasts its commercial loans will rise 6 percent in 2003. The bank’s loans grew 1.6 percent in the first quarter after an 11 percent drop in 2002.”
There were 26,619 bankruptcies in the holiday-shortened week.

It was another interesting employment report with evidence of a stabilizing yet highly unbalanced economy.  Manufacturing lost another 53,000 jobs (191,000 in three months), while Construction added 26,000 (up 53,000 in three months).  Service-producing added 12,000 jobs, with Credit Intermediation (Finance Activities) adding 19,000.  Notably, Temporary Help added 58,000 jobs, an abrupt reversal from the 48,000 lost over the past three months.  The government sector dropped 25,000 jobs.  Year-over-year, Goods-producing jobs sank 592,000, while Service-producing employment jumped 248,000.  Production workers dropped 505,000, while Construction jobs added 67,000.  Within Services, Financial Activities jobs added 140,000 and Health, Social Assistance added 292,000, while Wholesale Trade dropped 66,000, Retail Trade dropped 75,000 and Information jobs declined 133,000 year-over-year.

Construction spending remained resilient during April, and will surely only expand over the coming months.  For April, Total Construction Spending was down slightly for the month and was up 0.7% y-o-y.  Similar to the general economy, the aggregates miss the important detail.  Year-over-year, Single-family Residential Construction Spending was up 11.6% and Home Improvement spending increased 7%.  The continued strength in residential, however, was offset by weakness in Non-residential.  Year-over-year, Non-residential spending was down 13.1%, with Industrial down 24.5%, Office down 23.0%, and Hotels, Motels down 13%.  From April 1997, Single-family residential spending has surged 67%, while Non-residential is down 7%.  April Public sector construction spending was up 0.5% y-o-y, with Public Housing up 17.2%, and Military up 11.5%, while Industrial declined 11.4%.  Total Public Construction spending is up 30% from April 1997.

In general, I would assert that the service sector maintains an inflationary bias, in contrast to the manufacturing sector.  Thus we should not be surprised that “services” are more responsive to monetary stimulus.  The ISM Non-manufacturing index jumped 3.8 points to a strong 54.5 during May.  The last time the index was higher was this past November.  New Orders jumped an impressive 4.1 points to 54.7, while Backlog jumped 5.0 points to 51.0.  Curiously, Prices Paid declined almost 7 points to 49.6, and New Export Orders declined 3.5 points to 49.  Import Orders surged 8.5 points to 58.5.  The ISM Manufacturing index added four points to 49.4, the strongest reading since February.  Production rose above 50 (51.5) for the first time since February, and New Orders jumped a noteworthy 6.7 points to 51.9.  Backlog added 3.5 to 51, the highest reading since June of last year.  Prices Paid dipped 12.5 points to 51.5, the lowest level since February 2002.

The California Building Industry Association this week raised their estimate for 2003 state home construction by 6% to 180,000 units.  This would be up 6% from 2002 and the strongest construction boom since 1989.  According to the Construction Industry Research Board, 63,626 permits for new home construction were approved between January and April, up 27.2% from the same period last year.  (From Kelly Zito, SF Chronicle).

Freddie Mac 30-year mortgage rates dropped five basis points this week to a record low 5.26%.  The 15-year rate dropped to 4.66% and the one-year adjustable rate dipped four basis points to 3.59%.  Not surprisingly, the Mortgage Banker’s Association application index surged to new all-time highs, although the holiday-shortened week may have led to some distortions.  But as the data read, the composite Market index jumped 13.6% for the week to a new record.  Refi applications jumped 12.9% to a new record more than five times the year ago level.  Yet Purchase applications were the eye-opener.  Up 16.4% for the week, Purchase applications surged to a level more than 10% above the previous record.  This was up almost 50% from the February trough level.  We’ll be watching Purchase applications closely over the coming weeks.

Countrywide enjoyed “average daily application” volumes of $3.2 billion during May.  This was 19% above the record set the previous month, and compares to May 2002 average daily applications of $878 million.  Countrywide received on average 20,000 applications daily, with May loan funding “approximately $40 billion.”  This was almost three times the year ago May funding level.  Countrywide raised their estimate for total 2003 originations to $3.5 to $4.0 Trillion.

June 2 – David W. Berson, Fannie Mae chief economist:  “We have raised our projection of mortgage originations in 2003 to a record $3.7 trillion - up from our previous estimate of $3.3 trillion and from last year’s previous record of $2.6 trillion.  Both purchase and refinance volumes should set new records this year. Home sales through April are running about 3.5 percent ahead of last year’s record pace (new sales are 8.0 percent above last year, while existing sales are 2.4 percent above)…  Home sales are likely to climb to new records in 2003… Moreover, home price gains are still fairly strong - although increases have slowed some from the rapid pace of the past three years. We project a rise of 4.5-5.0 percent for home values this year. Combining the sales and price projections, we now expect purchase originations to climb by almost 7 percent to $1.08 trillion. Strong as that is, the real origination story is a refi one. Fannie Mae’s Mortgage Market Analysis Department estimates that with primary market fixed-rate mortgage yields around 5.30 percent, about 90 percent of all fixed-rate mortgages outstanding are ‘in the money’ to refinance. We project a rise in refinance originations of 61 percent to an astounding $2.59 trillion. This by itself is almost as large as last year’s total origination figure. While we have not yet completed an estimate of the cash-out share of refi originations for 2003, the dollar volume of equity removed during these refinancings will be very large.  The combination of record purchase originations and still strong cash-out refinancings should keep single-family mortgage debt outstanding (MDO) growth robust. We have raised our projection of MDO growth for 2003 to 10.0 percent, which would be the third consecutive year of double-digit growth - the first time since 1987-89 that MDO growth would be that strong for that long a period.”

It is worth pondering that the Mortgage Bankers Association earlier this year was projecting originations of $1.77 Trillion.  Now it appears we’ll do about double this amount and blow through last year’s blow-out record.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency today reported that U.S. Commercial Bank total notional derivative positions increased $5.35 Trillion during the first quarter (35% annualized) to $61.42 Trillion.  Total derivative positions were up $15 Trillion, or 33%, year-over-year.  By category, the first quarter saw Interest Rate derivatives expand $5.1 Trillion, or 38% annualized, to $53.5 Trillion.  Foreign Exchange increased by $167 billion (11% annualized) to $6.2 Trillion.  Credit Derivatives expanded by $75 billion (42% annualized) to $710 billion.  By issuer, the J.P. Morgan Chase Derivative Bubble saw total derivative exposure increase to $31.2 Trillion.  Bank of America followed with $13.5 Trillion and Citigroup ended the quarter with almost $12 Trillion of notional positions.  “Relative to the fourth quarter of 2002, there was an increase in trading revenues from cash instruments and derivative activities of $1.2 billion, to $3 billion in the first quarter of 2003.”

The Fed released first quarter Credit data week, our favorite quarterly “flow of funds” record of the creation and dispersion of Credit/liquidity.  Gross financial excesses and imbalances are again clearly illuminated in the Fed’s own report.  Total Credit Market Borrowings (non-financial and financial) increased to $32.3 Trillion, surpassing 300% of GDP.  This is up from 256% of GDP at the beginning of 1998.  First quarter annualized Total Credit growth of $2.363 Trillion (7.0%) compares to Q1 2002’s $1.921 Trillion (6.2%).  Total Credit growth would have been stronger had it not been for the aberrational 2.2% annualized expansion of federal government borrowings.  Total Credit Market Borrowings are now up $11.1 Trillion, or 52%, over the past 21 quarters (since the beginning of 1998).

Total Non-federal borrowings increased at a 7.4% rate, compared to Q1 2002’s 5.9%.  Once again, Credit growth is being driven by the Mortgage sector.  Household Mortgage borrowings expanded at a 12.0% annualized rate, compared to Q1 2002’s 10.3%.  Non-financial Corporate borrowings expanded at a 3.0% annualized rate, the strongest pace since the Q4 2001.  State & Local governments increased borrowings at a 10.1% annualized rate, almost double the rate from Q1 2002.

The historic financial sector expansion runs unabated, with financial borrowings increasing at a 9.7% annualized rate (vs. Q1 2002’s 9.3%).  Financial sector debt is up 10% y-o-y.   Financial sector borrowings have now increased 94% to $10.6 Trillion since the beginning of 1998.  Once again, “structured finance” dominated financial sector expansion.  The GSEs, outstanding Asset-backed Securities, and outstanding Mortgage-backed Securities combined for $765 billion of annualized expansion during the quarter, a growth rate of 9.4% to $8.29 Trillion (up 106% since 1998).  By category, GSE borrowings expanded at a 7.9% rate to $2.6 Trillion (up 10.6% y-o-y).  MBS expanded by 8.6% to $3.23 Trillion (up 9.2% y-o-y) and outstanding ABS increased at a 12.2% rate during the quarter to $2.47 Trillion (up 13.3% y-o-y).  Outstanding “structured finance” borrowings (GSE, MBS, and ABS) increased to 77.5% of GDP.  This is up from 47% at the start of 1998 and 28% to begin the nineties.

The vast majority of “structured finance” expansion is today financing the Mortgage Finance Bubble.  Total Mortgage (Household, Commercial and other) Credit expanded at an annualized rate of $916 billion (10.8%), compared to $706 billion (9.2%) during Q1 2002.  Total Mortgage Credit is up $936.7 billion, or 12.1%, to $8.7 Trillion during the past year.  For comparison, non-financial Corporate borrowings increased $85 billion, or 1.7%, during the past four quarters to $4.95 Trillion.  It is also worth noting that Total Mortgage Borrowings increased $1.04 Trillion during the first six years of the 1990s.  The system will likely extend a similar amount of new Mortgage Credit during the twelve months of 2003.

Total Mortgage Credit is up $3.45 Trillion, or 65.5%, over 21 quarters, with Household Mortgage borrowings up $2.65 Trillion, or 66%.  And now things are accelerating into problematic “blow-off” excess.  It is worth noting that Household Mortgage borrowings were up $766 billion during the past four quarters (13%) to $6.64 Trillion.  This compares to average Household Mortgage debt growth of $194 billion during the first seven years of the nineties ($236 billion yearly average for the decade).

It is also worth mentioning the composition of liabilities being created nowadays by the Asset-backed Securities trusts.  ABS trusts expanded assets at an annualized rate of $352.2 billion during the first quarter.  Yet on the liability side, Commercial Paper issued actually contracted at an annualized rate of $51.3 billion.  At the same time, Corporate Bonds issued expanded at an annualized $378 billion.  Let’s compare the liability composition of Q1 2003 to year 2000.  For 2000, ABS assets expanded almost $190 billion.  On the liability side, Commercial Paper increased $121 billion and Corporate Bonds expanded $69 billion (about 2/3 financed by short-term liabilities and 1/3 by long-term).  Between 1998 and 2001 almost half of ABS asset expansion was funded through the Commercial Paper market, certainly contributing to the expansion of Money Market fund assets.  Today, in contrast, ABS expansion is financed in the bond market.  I would say that this, along with GSEs increasing the relative share of long-term debt issuance, helps explain why “money supply” (monetary liabilities) growth has slowed somewhat in the face of continued strong Credit expansion.  This is why it is necessary to focus on “broad money” and, more importantly, sectoral Credit growth.

The Security Brokers and Dealers increased “Net Acquisition of Financial Assets” by $229 billion annualized, the strongest growth since the third quarter of 2001.  Agency holdings expanded at a $145 billion annualized rate and Miscellaneous Assets increased at a $194 billion pace.  On the liability side, “Security Credit” expanded at a $144 billion annualized pace, with most of the Credit coming from the banking system.

Total Commercial Banking holdings of Financial Assets expanded at a record $785 billion annualized rate (8.7%) during the quarter to $7.5 Trillion.  Total Assets were up 10.2% y-o-y, compared to the 4.7% growth rate during the preceding 12 months.  Security Credit (mostly lending to Securities Brokers) increased at a record $113 billion pace during the quarter to a record $207 billion.  Miscellaneous Assets expanded at an annualized rate of $314.6 billion to a record $1.54 Trillion.  Looking at year-over-year changes in Commercial Banking loan categories, (business) Bank Loans declined $102 billion (down 7.2%), while Mortgages surged $300 billion (up 16.7%).  Consumer Credit increased $24.6 billion, or 4.5%, while Security Credit jumped $48.1 billion, or 30.3%.  For comparison, let’s look at loan growth by category for the pre-Bubble year 1997.  Bank (business) Loans increased $128.1 billion, or 12.3%, while Mortgages gained $99.9 billion, or 8.7%.  Consumer Credit actually declined $14.2 billion (down 2.7%), while Security Credit expanded $21.7 billion (21.5%).

State and Local Governments have increased borrowings by $224 billion, or 18%, over the past 18 months.  This is about the amount of total State and Local Government debt growth during the preceding four and one-half years.

During the quarter, Credit Market Borrowings by Non-financial sectors increased at a $1.34 Trillion rate, compared to $767 billion during pre-Bubble 1997.  While the increase in the rate of debt growth is significant, the composition of the borrowings is even more notable.  During Q1 2003, the Household sector accounted for 67.5% of non-fed non-financial borrowings ($849.2 billion annualized), compared to 43.4% during 1997 ($332.7 billion).  Conversely, the non-financial corporate sector accounted for 11.8% ($148.7 billion annualized) of borrowings during the first quarter compared to 38% ($291.6 billion) during 1997.  State & Local Governments have increased their share from 1997’s 5.4% ($41.5 billion) to the first quarter’s 11.6% ($146.3 billion annualized).  Fed data illuminates the historic shift to non-productive Credit creation that accelerated during 1998.

The Rest of World “Net Acquisition of (U.S.) Financial Assets” jumped to $866.1 billion annualized, or to an almost 11% growth rate.  This compares to Q1 2002’s annualized increase of $394 billion (about 2%).  Rest of World increased holdings of Credit Market Instruments at an annualized $463 billion (13.8%), with holdings of Agencies increasing at a $139 billion pace and Corporate Bonds (including ABS and MBS) at $247 billion.  Notably, Foreign Direct Investment in U.S. expanded at an annualized $75 billion during the quarter, or at a pace of less than 5%. Foreign Direct Investment in U.S. has collapsed since peaking at $307.7 billion during 2001 (averaging $220 billion between 1997 and 2000).  With dollar liquidity flooding the global financial system, foreign holders are accumulating amazing quantities of U.S. securities.  Since the beginning of 1998, Rest of World Holdings of Credit Market Instruments has surged $1.37 Trillion, or 65%, to $3.47 Trillion.


Well, Critical Issues become clearer in the data by the week, although one must disregard the ‘aggregates” and focus on the detail.  Critical Issues conspicuously appeared in the detail of today’s employment data and in the Fed’s “flow of funds” Credit report.  A dysfunctional Credit system has created and now exacerbates a severely unbalanced economy.  Abundant liquidity flows to the Mortgage arena and “services,” sectors demonstrating a continued inflationary bias.  With “easy money” stoking easy financial profits, the broader financial sector boom runs unabated.  In stark contrast, challenging economic profits (the consequence of Credit-induced sectoral over-expansion and price distortions) has liquidity avoiding manufacturing and “goods-producing” for the lovely green pastures of financial speculation.  More Liquidity Equals Further Imbalances.

Critical Issues also emerge more clearly by the day throughout the financial markets.  The Fed has succeeded in inciting a major destabilizing short-squeeze throughout the stock market, and I will assume something similar has unfolded in corporate bonds and Credit default swaps.  If our Fed governors actually believe they can subtly manipulate today’s unruly markets they are in the process of learning a lesson.  The Treasury market has gone into melt-up mode dislocation, with negative effects on the soundness of the mortgage-back and derivatives markets.  Market melt-ups are nonetheless exciting and stoke the optimistic imagination, but the resulting distortions always come back to haunt.  Let there be no doubt, the seeds for future acute financial crisis have been fastidiously sown. “Buyers’ panics” do juice confidence and enliven animal spirits.  They are not, however, known for allocating liquidity or resources effectively or in moderation.  Let’s not forget the destruction wrought by the previous speculative melt-ups in telecom debt or technology stocks.  More Liquidity Equals Further Imbalances.  And it should be recognized that the confederated Credit and Mortgage Finance Bubbles are more systemic than anything previously experienced.  

I recently wrote that we have today “an energized financial sphere face to face with a despondent economic sphere.”  Well, the more I ponder this most extraordinary environment the more I believe this line of analysis has some merit.  More than ever before, the Credit system is today the Horse pulling the economic cart.  Yet the analytical and policy focus remains fixated on the cart.  How is everyone missing the reality that the Horse has gone nuts, and that administering mega-doses of stimulants is not going to work out in the best interest of those riding the wavering carriage?

Over the years, our contemporary (structured finance-driven) Credit system has drifted to an overwhelming emphasis on volume, asset-based lending and leveraged speculation.  It long ago lost its “reins” to prudent, economic profits-driven lending.  Unharnessed and lacking any discipline or direction, the Credit system mindlessly wanders only farther from familiar and protected terrain.  The financial system becomes only further distorted by the month to the point of losing the capacity to effectively allocate a reasonable quantity of financial resources to the real economy. It instead inundates destabilizing speculative finance excessively to hot sectors, especially the asset markets. (Can there be a more compelling example than the past few weeks in the stock market?)  In short, the (Credit) mechanism for creating and allocating liquidity (purchasing power) has become completely dysfunctional.  But this Critical Issue is lost with the Fed and others’ focus on the maladjusted and despondent economy, the very economic system that is the creation of our deranged Credit system (Crazy Horse).  

The nexus of the Great Credit Bubble is, in reality, its capacity to extend enormous Credit and incite unprecedented speculation, yet do it in such an atypically unsound and uneven manner.  The Bubble is sustained by its “dysfunctionality.” After all, a less unsound financial system disbursing today’s volume of Credit/liquidity effectively (To a non-bubble/non-maladjusted economy) would surely fuel a traditional recovery.  The Credit market would then necessarily anticipate heightened borrowing demands, higher market rates, and eventual Fed monetary restraint.  Lending excesses and wild stock market speculation would be expected to alarm our central bankers, and the thought of an alarmed Fed would induce considerable consternation (and restraint!) for aggressive lenders and leveraged speculators.  Such typical market dynamics would provide a crucial regulating/self-adjusting mechanism. But today is another world.  Quite mistakenly, the Fed has virtually taken fear out of the equation, and we are witnessing the consequences.

The maladjusted U.S. Bubble economy – fashioned and sustained by a hopelessly dysfunctional financial system – specifically will not demonstrate the type of traditional responses to monetary stimulus that would be expected to engender a movement back toward monetary balance (or restraint).  And that is damn good news for those so aggressively feasting on financial excess; but only for them.  It is also specifically why this is such an extraordinarily dangerous Bubble.

Pondering the current environment, the stock market has quickly returned to a wildly speculative, unstable environment.  Junk bonds, convertible securities, and the emerging markets are all demonstrating unmistakable signs of excessive liquidity and speculation.  Gross financial excess is also corroding the value of the dollar and fostering erratic global currency markets.  Meanwhile, the Credit market is in a destabilizing melt-up, inciting unprecedented lending and speculating excesses.  The Mortgage Finance Bubble has been prodded into its terminal stage of parabolic excess.  And, guess what?  Job growth is sufficiently lifeless and corporate pricing power notably tepid throughout the distorted real economy, that the Credit market has the enviable luxury of anticipating yet another rate cut.  The Horse becomes only more obnoxious and disobedient by the week.

I found it rather interesting that Pimco’s Paul McCulley ended his June article with “Good Lord willing, things’ll work out.”  Well, things are not going to “work out”.  And I hope when this Mother of All Reliquefications inevitably blows up, The Inflationists Greenspan, Bernanke, McCulley, Kudlow, McTeer and others will admit where they went wrong.  The public will deserve an honest explanation, and future generations should have the benefit afforded a forthright and accurate historical record.

05/29/2003 The New New Game *


What a week; what’s that saying about root canals…  For the holiday-shortened week, the Dow’s 3% surge was slightly bettered by the S&P500.  The Transports and Morgan Stanley Cyclical indices gained about 4%.  The Morgan Stanley Consumer index added almost 3%, while the Utilities gained less than 1%.  The broader market was in near melt-up mode, with the small cap Russell 2000 surging 5.4% and the S&P400 Mid-cap Index gaining 4.4%.  The Russell 2000 and S&P400 have gained 28.5% and 24.3% off of March lows.  The technology sector continues to outperform.  The NASDAQ100 gained 6%, increasing y-t-d gains to almost 18%.  The Morgan Stanley High Tech index jumped 7%, increasing 2003 gains to 28%.  The Semiconductors surged 11% (up 32% y-t-d) and The Street.com Internet index jumped 6% (up 40% y-t-d).  The NASDAQ Telecom index gained 5%, increasing y-t-d gains to 30%.  The Biotechs added 4%, with 2003 gains of 33%.  The financial stocks were sizzling as well, with the Securities Broker/Dealer index surging 10% and the Banks 4%.  The Brokers and Banks have rallied 51% and 27% off of March lows.  Although bullion gave back $4.20 of recent gains, the HUI gold index was about unchanged.

Notably, surging stock prices caused little consternation in the Treasury market.  Two-year Treasury yields actually declined five basis points to 1.35%, while five-year yields dipped three basis points to 2.29%.  The 10-year Treasury yield increased four basis points to 3.37%, while the long-bond gave back 11 basis points of its recent spectacular yield decline (to 4.37%).  Benchmark Mortgage-backs appeared to have enjoyed atypical out-performance, with agency debt generally performing in line with Treasuries.  The spread on Fannie’s 4 3/8 2013 note gained less than one basis point to 35.  The benchmark 10-year dollar swap was about unchanged at 35.  Corporate spreads were mixed, but generally little changed.  The dollar index gained slightly for the week, while the CRB index dipped about 2%.  

May’s $70 billion of corporate debt issuance (according to Bloomberg) was the most since February.  This week DaimlerChrysler sold bonds worth $2.5 billion (raised from $2 billion) at 3.826% (149 basis points over Treasuries), Allstate $400 million, Kellogg $500 million, Sara Lee $1 billion, Ryland Group $150 million, and Autozone $200 million (to name only a few).  Junk issuance remains strong.  Crum & Forster issued $300 million, Texas Industries $600 million, Triton PCS $725 million, and Lamar $125 million.  However, two junk offerings were postponed due to the glut of issues.  It was a huge week for the convertible bond market, capping off a “phenomenal month.”  May’s $11 billion of sales (45 companies) was the strongest in a couple years and triple the level from May 2002.  This week’s transactions included Celgene’s $300 million, Cypress’s $500 million, Lucent’s $1.5 billion, Juniper Networks’ $350 million, American Financial Group’s $175 million, Delta Air’s $300 million, and Ask Jeeves’ $100 million.   

May 30 – Dow Jones (Michael Mackenzie):  “Convertible debt issuance is surging in the U.S., but the credit derivatives market is taking little notice.  That’s quite a contrast to previous years, when a bulging pipeline of this type of paper, which can convert to equity some time in the future, had investors scurrying to buy credit protection. Now, with the credit climate looking better every month, the need to hedge debt exposure is diminishing.”
May 28 – Bloomberg:  “Lucent Technologies Inc., the biggest U.S. telephone-equipment maker, said it raised $1.53 billion in a sale of convertible debt, 18 percent more than planned… Demand for the debt allowed…Lucent to set an interest rate of 2.75 percent on both bonds, the low end of its expectations. Lucent took advantage of an 81 percent increase in its share price this year and increased demand for convertible bonds to boost the size of the two-part offering from $1.3 billion. The funds raised will help the unprofitable company meet its goal having of $2.5 billion in cash at the end of September. About 100 companies have raised more than $35 billion in convertible bond sales this year.”

May 28 – Bloomberg:  “Adelphia Communications Corp., the cable-television company operating under bankruptcy protection, reached an agreement with bank lenders to gain access to $1.5 billion in financing.  The company plans to draw on the credit line to resume upgrading its cable systems…  Adelphia, the fifth-largest U.S. cable operator, lags the industry in improving its systems to offer more channels and services.”

The South Korean government tapped the global bond market for the first time since 1998.  Five times oversubscribed, the issue was sold with a yield of 4.307% (only 92 basis points over Treasuries!).  South Korea’s foreign currency reserves ended April at $123.6 billion, up from less than $10 billion during the 1997/98 crisis.  Will abundant global liquidity and record low interest rates be the catalyst for surprising growth in Asia and throughout emerging markets (Brazil, Russia, India, Argentina, etc.)? 

May 29 – Bloomberg:  “Russia’s bonds gained after the country’s foreign currency and gold reserves surged $3.2 billion, the biggest one-week gain since the financial crisis of 1998. Russia’s benchmark 2030 dollar bond rose 1.35 cents on the dollar to a record 97.85 cents, cutting the yield to 6.79 percent…”

May 30 – Bloomberg:  “MBIA Inc., the world’s largest bond insurer, guaranteed payments on $1.93 billion pesos ($187 million) of debt sold by two Mexican toll road operators, a tool that could encourage lenders to finance new private highways.  The bonds, which will be used to repay existing debt and fund operations, were awarded Standard & Poor’s highest rating of AAA because of the guarantee, which helped attract pension funds and insurance companies as buyers. The guarantee was first of its kind for MBIA in Mexico.”
May 29 – Market News International (Claudia Hirsch):  “Heavy with reserves, central banks are beginning to expand their credit risk appetite beyond sovereigns and into agencies, asset-backeds, mortgage pass-throughs and even some corporate paper, according to a senior portfolio manager with input on nearly $300 billion in fixed income assets.  ‘They have huge pools of money and they want to be able to show greater results,’ said Connie Plaehn, managing director for J.P. Morgan Fleming Asset Management…”

May 30 – Bloomberg:  “Japan’s government sold a record amount of yen in May to stem the currency’s advance as it reached its highest in more than two years against the dollar…  Foreign-exchange transactions in the Bank of Japan’s current account balance rose by 3.98 trillion yen ($33.5 billion) this month. That’s 24 percent more than its previous record sale of 3.21 trillion yen in September 2001.”

Official Foreign Holdings of U.S. Debt increased $10.9 billion to $927.7 billion, with four-week gains of $40.7 billion. 

Broad money supply (M3) expanded $5.5 billion last week.  Demand and Checkable Deposits jumped $11.9 billion and Savings Deposits added $2.0 billion.  Small Denominated Deposits declined $1.9 billion and Retail Money Fund deposits dipped $2.8 billion.  Institutional Money Fund deposits declined $2.3 billion and Large Denominated Deposits declined $1.2 billion.  Repurchase Agreements increased $5.0 billion, while Eurodollars declined $6.3 billion.  Elsewhere, total Commercial Paper declined $1.3 billion to $1.351 Trillion, with Non-financial CP declining $2.5 billion (to $140.6 billion) and Financial CP adding $1.3 billion (up $44.3 billion over five weeks to $1.21 Trillion).  Following recent strong expansion, Total Bank Assets declined $34.9 billion during the most recent week.  Securities Holdings increased $5.0 billion, while Loans and Leases declined $14.2 billion.  Commercial and Industrial Loans declined $3.1 billion and Real Estate loans dropped $14.0 billion.  May was another strong month for the ABS marketplace, with year-to-date issuance of $173 billion up 14% y-o-y.

May 29 – Bloomberg:  Quoting inflation “expert” Donald Ratajczak: “The April (pricing) figures weren’t very good.  The deflation word for that month was appropriate because we do look at unit labor costs and they’re not performing well and they’re now starting not to perform well because of slowing wage growth.  (On the dollar) Another indicator we look at is the value of the currency and our currency is devaluing, which is an inflationary act.  If that was the only thing we were looking at, we’d say that we’re starting to build in potential inflation, not deflation. I won’t say that we’ve abandoned the strong dollar policy, but we basically have told the investors that if you want to try and get a quick return by selling short the dollar you’ve probably got a good opportunity to do so.  This is a policy shift, and it’s understandable.  If you are worried about deflation then you’ve got to put more of your currency out there. If it’s flooding the international market, then maybe that’s the conduit for it. If the banks here won’t lend the money, you can’t flood the domestic market because most of your money is bank-created and if they’re not creating it by making loans and putting the money to work, then you have to do it in the currency markets.”

One of problems with Dr. Ratajczak’s line of reasoning is that U.S. Bank Credit is up 11% over the past year. 

May 28 – Market News International:  Quoting ECB chief economist Otmar Issing:  “No one can rule out negative inflation rates in Germany in the next two years.  But that has absolutely nothing to do with deflation (because Germany is part of a larger economic and monetary region). We are miles away from such developments.”  “The same is true for the eurozone as a whole, he said. The public debate on deflation risks in Germany has become almost ‘hysterical,’ he said.”

May 28 – Bloomberg:  “Canadian home resale prices rose to a record for the third straight month in April, a sign that demand for housing in the months ahead may prevent inflation from dropping as rapidly as some economists have predicted.  The average price rose 6.5 percent from a year earlier to C$201,838 ($146,637), 0.2 percent greater than the record set the previous month…Bank of Canada Governor David Dodge has said rising home prices have fueled inflation…”
The economy’s pulse is becoming less faint.  The May Chicago Purchasing Management index jumped a stronger-than-expected 4.6 points to 52.2.  New Orders surged 10 points to 54.6, the strongest reading since February.  Production jumped 9.5 points to 60.5.  Prices paid dipped 2.2 points, but remained above 50 (53.7).  It is worth noting that during the 2001 slowdown, the Chicago Purchasing Management index dropped to a low of 35.5 and did not surpass 46 during the entire year.   

First quarter Personal Income grew at a 3.9% annual rate.  And with Personal Taxes declining at a 4.1% annual rate, Disposable Income increased at a 5.0% rate.  Year-over-year, Personal Income increased 3.7%.  Tepid Wage and Salary growth of 2.9% was augmented by 7% growth in Transfer Payments and a 4.5% y-o-y decline in Personal Taxes.  Disposable Income was up 4.9% y-o-y.  Outlays were up 4.5% y-o-y.  No deflation apparent in the Income and spending data.

One must look beneath the aggregate 1.9% first quarter GDP growth rate to appreciate stark economic imbalances.  Durable Goods consumption contracted at a 1.8% pace, while Nondurables expanded at a 6.4% rate.   Gross Private Investment contracted at a 3.3% rate, with Non-residential Fixed Investment down 4.8% as Residential investment surged 11.0%.  Investment in Equipment and Software contracted at a 6.3% annualized rate.  The first quarter GDP price deflator increased to 2.5%, the first time above 2% in six quarters.  It has not been higher since the first quarter of 2001.  By category, Durables prices declined at a 3.7% rate, while Nondurable increased by 4.6% and Services by 3.1%.  Import prices surged to an 11.8% growth rate.

This week from the president of the California Association of Realtors: “2003 is shaping up to be another banner year for real estate.  While sales last month declined compared to a year ago, sales in April 2002 were at their highest level in the history of California’s residential real estate market. Year-to-date sales have declined 5 percent, in line with our expectations, while the median price continues to post double-digit gains.”  State median prices were up $46,810 (14.8%) y-o-y to $363,930.  At 2.5 months, “A low level of unsold inventory indicates a tight real estate market and is a key factor driving price appreciation in the state.”  DataQuick reported that 369 of 396 Californian cities enjoyed year-over-year price gains. 

Some of the strongest price inflation is at the lower-end, with Central Valley, High Desert, and Riverside/San Bernardino all posting 20% plus y-o-y gains.  Yet the upper-end remains notably resilient.  From PRNewswire:  “Luxury home values rose in California’s major metropolitan markets in the first quarter versus a year ago, with Los Angeles values gaining more than 11 percent, according to the Prestige Home Index by First Republic Bank…”  Luxury prices jumped 4.5% during the quarter in Los Angeles, 3.0% in San Francisco and 0.8% in San Diego.  The article included quotes from local real estate professionals.  “Malibu has gone into the stratosphere.  We have a limited amount of beachfront property, great schools and this is a terrific place to live.  Our entry level housing is pushing $1 million, and apartments, condos and beachfront properties are at levels we’ve never seen before.”  In Orange County “we’re seeing appreciation in almost every neighborhood, and in some cases, in excess of 20 percent. Sales are down because inventories are down, but prices are way up.  We continue to have a shortage of homes in this area.”  “San Francisco real estate doesn’t seem to be tied to the San Francisco economy.  The economy may be down a little, but real estate is still moving up…”

From the Illinois Association of Realtors:  “We have seen a dramatic upsurge in housing activity in the last month.  A continuation of four-decade low mortgage interest rates could drive the housing market to the second-best year on record.”  And from the Florida Association of Realtors:  “Buyers continued to boost Florida home sales to new heights in April… Statewide, the median cost of a resale in Florida rose 11%...”  Bloomberg quoted the chief economist of the National Association of Realtors:  “Although we anticipate some cooling in the housing markets going forward, most indicators right now indicate otherwise.”

This week from my mailbox:  “Congratulations Douglas C. Noland:  The Federal Housing Authority (FHA) has authorized Assistance For America, and our parent company, United Lending Partners, to assist you (to) find a home, get a loan, and most importantly, we FUND YOUR DOWN PAYMENT and PAY YOUR CLOSING COSTS – all for just a $750 one-time move-in cost.  That’s right.  Your financial responsibility for owning your home through this special FHA, United Lending Partners and AFA program is your one-time TOTAL MOVE-IN cost of $750.” (Their caps and underscores)

Mortgage applications jumped again.  For the week, Refi applications were up almost 6% to the third-highest level ever.  Refi applications surged 74% in four weeks, and were up 500% y-o-y.  Purchase applications were about unchanged for the week, although at a level 28% above February lows.  Purchase application volumes were up 14% y-o-y, while dollar volume was up 23%.  The average loans size was $195,700, with the average adjustable-rate mortgage at $325,100. 

April Existing Home Sales were reported at a stronger-than-expected annualized rate of 5.84 million, the fifth-highest on record.  The $207,900 average price was the second-highest, up 5.8% y-o-y (up 16% over two years).  Year-over-year Calculated Transaction Value (average price multiplied by annualized volume) was up 9.2% y-o-y (up 28% over two years and 39% over three years).   Compared to pre-Bubble April 1997, Calculated Transaction Value was up 98% (averages prices 42% and sales volume 39%). Curiously, the number of homes available for sale is up 15% over the past two months to the highest level since 1991.  The S&P Homebuilding Index is sporting a year-to-date gain of 46%.

New Home Sales were also stronger-than-expected, jumping to the briskest pace since December.  New Homes sold at an annualized rate of 1.028 million units, with 2003 sales on target to surpass last year’s record.  Sales volumes were up 12.2% from April 2002, and were up 38% from pre-Bubble April 1997.  The inventory of New Homes was unchanged and has been steady for the past five months.

Looking back, Fed funds were at 9.75% in May 1989.  By the end of 1990 the Fed had reduced short-term rates to 7.0%.  As the severity of the damage inflicted on our nation’s banking system from the collapse of the late-eighties junk bond and coastal real estate Bubbles became apparent, the Fed anxiously stepped on the monetary peddle.  Rates were chopped to 4.0% by the end of 1991.  Yet there remained strong perceptions (in the markets and real economy) that the economy was not sufficiently responding to even extreme monetary stimulus, this despite GDP expanding by plus 5% during 1992.  Fighting stiff “headwinds” from an impaired Credit system, the Greenspan Fed added some “insurance” by reducing rates another 100 basis points to 3.0% during 1992.  In all, it was 23 straight rate cuts and 675 basis points over a period of about 42 months. 

Importantly, although certainly not apparent at the time, the Greenspan Federal Reserve had set course on The Great Experiment of “Activist” Central Bank Market Manipulation.  By pegging short-term rates at low levels, the Fed learned that it could easily manipulate a steep yield curve that basically guaranteed profits for our troubled banking system.  No longer would the unpredictability of open-market purchases and bank reserve operations be the Fed’s main policy tools.  With the capacity to easily mastermind financial profits, the market no longer had cause to worry that open-market operations might fail to incite adequate bank lending – the old “pushing on a string” syndrome.  And no more was there much reason for the marketplace to fret the potential for another systemic Credit crunch induced by (post-boom) banking system capital impairment.  “The only fear of boom is fear itself…”  

And especially with the Fed-nurtured evolution to a securities-based Credit system - the proliferation of aggressive non-bank lenders (GSEs, MBS, ABS, Wall Street firms, etc.) - the manipulation of financial profits became the most powerful tool in the history of central banking.  It was akin to the Federal Reserve’s fateful discovery of the power of open-market operations back in the early 1920s.  And, similar to the Roaring Twenties fiasco, the Fed’s most recent market manipulation technique spiraled completely out of control.    

Interestingly, however, none of this was apparent back in those Dark Days of the Early Nineties.  The Fed had profoundly changed the rules – contrived a New Game.  Yet this momentous development was comprehended by few.  There were a small group of savvy speculators who recognized early on the extraordinary opportunity afforded by the Fed’s recapitalization efforts – the manipulation of yield curve profits to benefit the impaired banking system.  But the whole world wasn’t fixated on financial Games back then.  Of course, word eventually spread and the New Game caught on like wildfire.  And it was those final (“insurance”) cuts during 1992 that really threw gas on the speculative fire kindling in the Credit market.  The celebrated New Game ran amuck (and caught fire globally) during 1993. 

Although 1994 was a near debacle (U.S. Credit market dislocation, then the Mexican Collapse) and there were a few severe road bumps along the way, the leveraged speculating community has barely looked back since.  Each (duel) central bank (the Fed and GSEs) rescue has successfully emboldened the opportunists.  Today, “everyone” is seeking easy financial profits from Fed largess.  It is The Game and it is being played with an attentiveness and ferocity unlike anything experienced in the early nineties, or for a very long time.

Inarguably, the degree of financial speculation (and resulting economic distortions) has expanded commensurate with the ballooning of the system Credit.  Total outstanding Credit market debt has surged from 1990’s $13 Trillion to almost $32 Trillion by the end 2002.  So even with the collapse of the NASDAQ and stock market Bubbles, the Fed retained extraordinary power to manipulate financial profits and incite lending.  Rate cuts afforded the Fed the capacity to inflate the market value of the massive pool of Credit market debt, and the Fed still enjoyed a very captive audience with the leveraged speculators, the energized bankers, and non-bank Credit creators. 

Paradoxically, and significantly, despite a collapse of one of history’s major speculative Bubbles, the bursting of the stock market was more than compensated by the massive surge in Credit market speculation.  With money flooding into the hedge fund community and Wall Street ballooning balance sheets in anticipation of a slew of Fed rate cuts, the overall size of the speculative pool of finance only inflated.  It was a close call, but the determined Fed retained it coveted policy tool (the massive pool of speculative finance).  It was, however, quickly running out of interest rate ammo.  Alan Greenspan also played his “trump card” (with the complicity of the GSEs and leveraged speculators), sustaining the Credit Bubble by inciting unprecedented mortgage Credit borrowings. 

Yet there is today no doubt that our central bank has lost much of it its flexibility.  There have been some very significant developments along the way:  The extraordinary ballooning of leverage and speculation throughout the U.S. financial system has greatly increased systemic risk to “reflation.” Indeed, never has a financial system been more vulnerable to higher interest rates, emanating from the highly over-borrowed consumer and corporate sectors, as well as the egregiously exposed financial and “speculator” arenas. The ballooning Mortgage Finance Bubble is an unmitigated disaster in the making, pierced by any meaningful rise in rates or slowdown in Credit growth.  At the same time, there is the Credit Bubble Reality that greater lending and speculating excess achieve diminishing marginal returns in the imbalanced real economy.  That is the real story of the post-stock market Bubble experience - the distorted Bubble “service sector” (monetary) economy that is only stabilized by truly enormous financial excess.  And there is absolutely no escape.

On the one hand, the Fed is boxed into a perilous corner, with no alternative than to accommodate only more egregious lending, financial leveraging and speculating.  This is a fact of life that I and a few others have for sometime been fixated.  But we simply cannot today disregard the Fed’s thus far enduring capacity to manipulate financial profits and incite financial excess.  In some key ways, the Fed has never been more powerful; they have certainly never “played” to such an enormous and adoring crowd.  And the greater the risk that this financial house of cards could come crashing down, the more aggressive, determined, and conniving the Fed.  We are today at no analytical disadvantage operating with the premise that the Greenspan Fed is militant in its endeavors. 

I continue to read “bearish” analysts dismissing the effectiveness of the Fed’s reliquefication efforts.  They use as evidence continued strong bankruptcy filings, foreclosures, and unemployment claims.  I also read seemingly reasonable analysis that there is nowadays a highly atypical divergence: the stock market has priced in a recovery, while the bond market has discounted “deflation” and recession, betting on the impotence of Fed reliquefication efforts.  One of the markets must have it very wrong, apparently.

But I just can’t shake the sense that these lines of reasoning, while valid on the surface, are nonetheless completely missing the point.  Similar to the collapse of interest rates and risk premiums globally, something very significant must be in the works.  This is no time to be dismissive, but rather an extraordinary environment demanding deliberate contemplation.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to argue against the analysis that Fed reliquefication has become quite successful over the past few months.  Moreover, it appears that, akin to the early nineties, the “activist” Greenspan Federal Reserve has once again profoundly changed the rules of The Game.  Over a decade ago the Fed was forced to aggressively peg short-term interest rates at a low level.  This manipulation of financial profits was a desperate effort to ward off financial collapse and potential depression.  Its endeavors were too successful.  The ensuing rush of “innovation” toward a securities-based Credit system, with the proliferation of leveraged speculation, derivatives/financial engineering/GSE risk intermediation/credit insurance, and resulting historic asset Bubbles, then forced the Fed to implicitly guarantee abundant financial market liquidity.  Each step of the way, the Fed nurtured excess and financial “evolution” accelerated. Bubble dynamics took deep root.

Last year it appeared that the Fed was nearing the end of its rope.  It was increasingly apparent that The Great Credit Bubble was faltering in the face of even the most extreme accommodation of financial excess.  The Fed then saw little option but to take The Final Step and move toward implicitly guaranteeing stable-to-lower long-term rates, while at the same time intimating that short-term rates were “pegged” indefinitely.  Such a momentous leap in activist central banking only appears a subtle maneuver.  And the Fed is shrouding this historic policy shift in terms of some sophisticated preemptive fight against deflation.

It is also increasingly apparent that our analytical focus must move away from conjecturing whether Fed policies have been or will be “effective.” Rather, we will find value in analysis that focuses on the ramifications and consequences of The New New Game.    

First of all, it appears that we have returned to an environment where the stock and bond markets share a mutual benefactor – the Fed-induced liquidity deluge.  Apparently gone are the days of mutual disdain and quite divergent wants and needs.  We would expect bond managers will refrain from predicting stock market disaster, and equity managers will keep quiet about the bond market Bubble.  The Fed has gone out and designed a trough that can feed all takers.  With The New New Game guaranteeing an all-powerful confluence of abundant liquidity, ultra-low short-rates, and basically “pegged” long-term yields, the leveraged speculators (along with aggressive lenders, derivative players, and Credit system generally) all of a sudden no longer despise the stock market.  The nineties lusty kinship has been rekindled and gone is the bond market’s trepidation for the capacity of equity rallies to spur confidence and economic recovery.  Indeed, Wall Street has quickly (look at their stocks!) come to the glorious recognition that a buoyant stock market is now great for its investment banking business (converts, junk, MBS, ABS, CDO, etc.), without even endangering their enormous leveraged bond holdings.  We’ll have to excuse The Street for once again succumbing to thoughts of financial nirvana.
   
But it is no delusion that the Fed has created an extraordinary environment for the financial sector.  The little remnant that the interaction of supply and demand impacts the price of Credit has been completely repudiated.  The Credit spigot is being turned wide open.  And with Lucent raising $1.5 billion and lenders approving a $1.5 billion financing for Adephia Communications and $1.1 billion for Williams Company, the “Firing on Most Cylinders” analogy is in need of an “upgrade.”  How much corporate Credit growth will now combine with record household and government borrowings?  My analysis continues to point to the likely possibility that we have commenced the parabolic “blow-off” period of Credit Bubble excess.    

While it would be quite uncharacteristic of previous episodes, the “bulls” should attempt to control their euphoria.  There is, after all, a lengthy history of how these terminal stages of excess end.  This unfolding disaster will make history.  There is absolutely no possibility that the liquidity deluge will flow evenly to the imbalanced U.S. economy.  There is every possibility that it will stoke destabilzing asset Bubbles and nurture problematic booms and busts.  The housing market – the sector with the strongest inflationary bias - has commenced a most dangerous phase.  Localities with limited inventory will generally experience further price distortions, while areas with capacity for new construction will face problematic over-building.  The environment now clearly recalls the wild influx of speculative finance, and resulting spending and resource squandering, which engulfed the telecom sector back in 1999.  There will, similarly, be no escaping the financial carnage and wholesale destruction of wealth wrought by such major marketplace dislocations.

And why finance or build any productive capacity when profits are so easily garnered playing the Mortgage Finance Bubble and yield curve?  But perhaps Trickle Down Finance will suffice, and a small portion of wild Credit excess will at some point find its way domestically into productive investment.  But in the meantime, extreme mortgage lending excess will fuel over-consumption and only larger trade deficits.  This mechanism will continue to spew liquidity globally.  The dollar will be pressured on two fronts.  First, there will be unrelenting market pressure as this surfeit of dollar liquidity is exchanged for local and other currencies.  Second, this global liquidity cataclysm will amplify the inflationary bias taking hold in non-dollar assets.  Speculative financial flows will increasingly seek to exit the dollar, and dollar vulnerability will prove The New New Game’s perennial failing.

And let’s not forget the stock market.  Just as the Fed is powerless to direct liquidity to productive investment or to spread it evenly throughout the economy, it is totally incapable of transforming our equity market into any semblance of a mechanism that effectively allocates finance and limited economic resources.  Not gonna happen.  Years ago the equity market was transformed into a bad joke of senseless speculation, and not even a protracted bear market has changed this harsh reality. Destabilizing speculation has awoken from hibernation.  And this is a real problem for our financial system and economy, as well as for our central bank that will again be negligently dismissive of gross financial excess until it is much too late.  With the Fed having “successfully” incited risk-taking throughout the Credit market, it is increasingly a case of the poorly performing, financially weak companies having been granted a new lease on life.  And it surely doesn’t hurt that these are precisely the type of stocks that have accumulated large short positions during the bear market.  Add it all up and the marketplace hasn’t so giddily squeezed the shorts in years.  Better buy the stock of crummy companies while you still have a chance!  So why would anyone even bother to search for value and sound companies with enticing business opportunities?    

The New New Game may be proceeding swimmingly, but there will be few winners and many losers.  Losses will be catastrophic.  The Fed, once again, will only lose further control of its “Experiment,” with dangerously speculative markets coming back to bite the hands of “kindhearted” global central bankers.  The amount of Credit and speculative excess required today to sustain, let alone stimulate, the distorted U.S. Bubble economy is truly frightening.  And while all signs today point to enormous forthcoming liquidity for the real economy, dysfunctional Monetary Processes will do the allocation job especially poorly.  You can bet on it.  I see only greater quantities of destabilizing speculative finance, endemic boom and bust dynamics, a hopelessly unsound and erratic U.S. Bubble economy, a completely deranged Credit system, and an unfolding dollar disaster.  It is truly a despicable Bubble and a despicable Game the Fed is playing with it.  But for now, what I see as hideous and ugly others fancy for its breathtaking beauty.  I certainly won’t be tuning in to Kudlow and Cramer for awhile.     

05/22/2003 You Just Gotta Love Congressman Ron Paul *

Despite Monday’s drubbing, the broader market ended the week with gains.  The small cap Russell 2000 added 1% and the S&P400 Mid-cap index gained about one-half percent.  With today’s nearly 4% gallop, the Utilities posted a 5% rise for the week (up 29% from February lows).  The more “speculative” issues continue to outperform.  The Amex Biotech index added almost 3% today (7.5% for the week), increasing year-to-date gains to 28%.  The Biotechs are now up 41% from March 12th lows.  Yet despite a reasonably strong showing through much of the week, the major averages were unable to dig fully out of Monday’s hole.  For the week, the Dow, S&P500, and Transports declined 1%.  The Morgan Stanley Cyclical index dropped 2%, while the Morgan Stanley Consumer index shed one-half percent.  The technology sector gave back a portion of recent strong gains, as the NASDAQ100 and Morgan Stanley High Tech indices declined 2%.  The Street.com Internet (up 32% y-t-d) and NASDAQ Telecommunications (up 24% y-t-d) indices gave up 1%.  The Semiconductors declined 3%.  The recent highflying Securities Broker/Dealers dipped 3%, while the resilient Banks declined about 1%.  With gold surging an impressive $13.90, the HUI Gold index jumped 5%.

The Treasury “melt-up” became noticeably more unsettling for the Credit market this week, with mortgage-backed securities said to have posted their worst performance in two months.  For the week, two-year Treasury yields added four basis points to 1.35%.  But that was the exception in the government market, as 5-year Treasury yields declined another seven basis points (2.32%) and 10-year yields dropped eight basis points (3.34%).  The long-bond saw its yield sink 15 basis points to 4.26%.  Benchmark mortgage-backed securities actually saw yields rise one basis point, although agency yields generally declined in line with Treasuries.  The spread on Fannie’s 4 3/8% 2013 note narrowed two to 35.  The benchmark 10-year dollar swap, however, widened 4 to 34.75.  Corporates generally could not keep pace with surging Treasuries, with spreads widening marginally.  Junk spreads widened moderately.  The dollar index sank another 1%, and the CRB index declined 1% this week.

Freddie Mac posted mortgage rates dropped 11 basis points to a record low 5.34%, with one-year adjustable rates declining six basis points to 3.61%.  Housing stocks are on fire, with the S&P Homebuilders index up 7% this week and 39% y-t-d.

The corporate issuance boom runs unabated: Fannie Mae priced $4 billion of 5-year benchmark notes at a spread of 24 basis points over Treasuries. Johnson & Johnson issued $1.0 billion, General Motors $425 million, Gillette $300 million, Texas Gas $250 million, Enbridge Energy Partners $400 million, Consumer Energy $250 million, TGT Pipeline $185 million, Alliance Pipeline $300 million, Pulte Homes $400 million, Fifth Third Bank $500 million, Hartford Finance $250 million, Cox Communications $600 million, PPL Electric $100 million, International Lease Finance $325 million, and ABN Amro $400 million.

May 22 – Bloomberg:  “Vertis Inc… and Apogent Technologies Inc… were among borrowers that sold more than $1 billion of high-yield, high-risk notes, as May sales of so-called junk bonds approach record levels. Demand for low-rated bonds has boomed as companies’ debt-reduction efforts have made investors more confident they’ll be repaid. Junk-rated borrowers pay interest of 6.7 percentage points more than U.S. Treasuries on average, down from 8.5 percentage points at the beginning of the year… Today’s junk-bond sales pushed issuance in May to about $15.7 billion, the most since Bloomberg began tracking the data in January 2001. Sales for the month could end up a record, narrowly topping a few months in early 1998…”

Junk issuers this week included Laidlaw International $400 million, El Paso Production $1.2 billion, Georgia-Pacific $650 million, Hard Rock Hotel $140 million, Iasis Healthcare $100 million, Providian Finance $250 million, Graham Packaging $100 million, Apogent technologies $250 million, HLI $250 million, Province Healthcare $200 million, Centerpoint Entertainment $400 million, Universal Compression $175 million, Thomas & Betts $125 million, Ingles Markets $100 million, Advanced Accessory Systems $150 million, Salt Holdings $180 million, Transmontaigne $200 million, Kaneb Pipe Line $250 million, Smithfield Foods $350 million, Rent-way $205 million, and Turning Stone $160 million.

May 22 – Bloomberg:  “Siemens AG’s sale of 2.5 billion euros ($2.9 billion) of convertible bonds is Europe‘s biggest sale of equity-linked securities since Novartis AG raised 2.8 billion euros through Deutsche Bank AG in November 2001.”

The convertible bond market is all the sudden hot, hot, hot.  Recent issuers include Sallie Mae ($2 billion), Northwest Airlines ($150 million), PPL Energy ($400 million), Silicon Valley Bancshares ($135 million), Regal Entertainment ($200 million) Magma Design ($150 million), and Valassis Communications ($160 million).  Also worth noting, CDO (collateralized debt obligation) issuance has said to have picked up considerably over the past month.

May 21 – Bloomberg:  “Turkey’s central bank said it bought foreign currency from local banks in its second unscheduled intervention in the currency market this month, after the lira posted its biggest gain in almost two months yesterday.”

May 21 – Bloomberg:  “Indian government bonds rose, and 10-year yields fell to a record, as banks invest the money workers abroad and companies doing business overseas have been sending home.  The $141 billion government bond market, the third-Biggest in Asia after Japan and Korea, has been rallying as investors take advantage of higher yields than they can get elsewhere. Investment in India has pushed the rupee to a two-year high and sent foreign-exchange reserves at the central bank to a record… India’s currency reserves have risen by almost $23 billion over a year to a record $78.6 billion because the central bank is buying some of the dollars coming from overseas. The rupee rallied for a third day to its strongest level since May 2001. It was headed for its biggest three-day rally since 1998.”  Five-year Indian government yields this week declined about 20 basis points to 5.30%, down from 8% at the beginning of 2002.

Here at home, broad Money Supply (M3) expanded $10.6 billion last week ($120.3 billion over four weeks).  Demand and Checkable Deposits declined $5.5 billion.  Savings Deposits expanded another $12.4 billion ($85.6 billion in three weeks), while Small Denominated Deposits declined $2.2 billion.  Retail Money Fund Deposits added $4.1 billion and Institutional Money Funds added $400 million.  Large Denominated Deposits declined $4.2 billion, while Eurodollars added $4.3 billion.  Elsewhere, Commercial Paper outstanding increased $8.5 billion (up $36.6 billion over four weeks) to the highest level since early December.  Non-financial CP added $400 million, while Financial CP jumped $8.1 billion ($43 billion over four weeks) to the highest level since September.  Bank Total Assets jumped $34.6 billion last week ($157 billion over four weeks!).  Securities holdings increased $14.4 billion.  Loan and Leases jumped $16.4 billion, although Commercial and Industrial Loans inched up only $200 million.  Real Estate Loans expanded $2.8 billion, Consumer Loans increased $1.6 billion, and Security loans added $7.2 billion.  With this week’s $11 billion of new ABS, y-t-d issuance of $169 billion is running almost 17% ahead of last year’s record pace.

May 22 – Bloomberg:  “General Electric Co.’s NBC, the top-rated U.S. television network among young adults, said it booked a record $3 billion in advertising sales for the next TV season, up 11 percent from last year and higher than forecasts. So-called upfront sales at the six major TV networks probably will rise 14 percent to $9.2 billion, the most ever, from $8.1 billion a year ago…”

May 22 – Los Angeles Times (Meg James):  “Network executives have been stunned by the amounts advertisers are paying — in some cases agreeing to rates more than 15% higher than during last year’s ‘upfront’ market, the week when networks sell more than three-fourths of their prime-time commercial inventory for the season that begins in the fall. The executives said they also have been surprised by the lightning-quick pace of the purchases… ‘This has moved very, very quickly,’ said Fox Television Entertainment Group Chairman Sandy Grushow. ‘For whatever reasons, there just seems to be a tremendous amount of money in the marketplace.’”

I would view surging advertising spending (at rising prices!) as an “inflationary manifestation” at the margin – an early "success" for reliquefication.  It makes sense that management, emboldened by collapsing corporate yields, newfound Credit availability and seemingly endless liquidity, would move quickly to increase marketing expenditures.  After all, it’s a lot easier and less risky than expanding plant & equipment and/or adding employees.  Some would even consider it sound “investment.”  For economic “output,” such expenditures are constructive near-term for GDP and perhaps even great for the “productivity miracle” (GDP divided by hours worked).  Such inflationary manifestations are relished by media franchises (good for asset prices!), advertising agencies and the blessed LeBron Jameses of the world.  But most folks, sectors, and the general economy see little benefit from what are really significant expenditures – providing a good example of Bubble distortions and economic imbalances.

I would further argue that such spending is an excellent example of our contemporary “monetary” economy that is sustained only by continued rampant Credit creation and monetary injection.  Sure, our financial sector can create additional claims, and this resulting purchasing power is easily spent on television advertising. But what true economic wealth-creating capacity is being added to support these new claims?  What are the consequences if continued enormous new claims (and purchasing power) are not forthcoming?  Or, from another angle, what are the ramifications for the dollar if this unrelenting inflation of claims/dollar debasement is sustained?

And in regard to new dollar claims, there is no good news on the federal deficit.  The normal April federal government surplus shrank to $51 billion, the smallest April surplus since 1995.  The fiscal year-to-date deficit of $202 billion is about three times the comparable deficit from the previous year.  Y-t-d revenues were down 5.4% to $1.056 Trillion, while spending was up 6.5% to $1.258 Trillion.  Year-to-date by major department, Defense spending was up 15.6%, Social Security up 4.0%, Health & Human Services up 9.2%, Agriculture 1.9%, Labor 18%, and Veterans’ Benefits 14.4%.  Interest expense was down 3.6%.  

April data from the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles are worth highlighting.  Combined Inbound Containers jumped 10% from March to the highest level since August, and were up 7% y-o-y.  Conversely, Outbound Containers declined 8% for the month to 3% below the year ago level.  Containers leaving the two ports empty were up 29% y-o-y, and accounted for 57% of total Inbound Containers for the month.

The Mortgage Bankers Association mortgage application index jumped almost 10% last week to the third highest on record.  The Refi index surged 15% (three-week gains of 64%) to almost five times the year ago level.  And while the Purchase Application index declined almost 5% for the week, it remained 15.5% above a year earlier.  In fact, Purchase Application dollars (as opposed to the number of applications) were up a noteworthy 28% from a relatively strong year ago level.  It is worth noting that the average loan was $193,100 last week.  The average Purchase mortgage was $201,200, the average Refi $190,500, and the average adjustable-rate mortgage was $316,700.  Record numbers of applications should be forthcoming.

Bankruptcy filings declined to 31,165, but were up about 7% y-o-y.

Freddie Mac struggled again during April.  For the month, its total book of business declined $12.6 billion (11.6% annualized) to $1.295 Trillion.  The company’s retained portfolio declined at a 1.2% annualized rate to $569 billion.  The Federal Home Loan Bank system reported first quarter Net Income of $456 million, up 1.6% y-o-y.  Those are pretty skinny profits on Total Assets that increased 11% to $780 billion.  Total Assets increased at a 9% annualized rate during the quarter.  The FHLB’s Derivative Liabilities item increased to $16.47 billion (up from the year earlier $5.7 billion)

May 20:  “Mortgage bankers originated new commercial/multifamily mortgages at a brisk pace during the first quarter of 2003, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association of America’s (MBA) quarterly survey of key commercial members. The $18.9 billion volume reported by survey participants was 38 percent higher than for the same period a year earlier.”

Official Foreign (central bank) Holdings of U.S. Debt jumped an eye-opening $20 billion last week to $916.8 billion, with these holdings up an unprecedented $170 billion (22.7%) from one year ago.  Official Holdings have been expanding at a 25.4% rate since early November.  This unparalleled ballooning of dollar reserve positions (as private dollar liquidations are accommodated by local central banks) is a key inflationary mechanism liquefying financial markets globally.   In contrast, Federal Reserve Bank Credit is up only about $5 billion so far this year (1.9% annualized) to about $712 billion.  Largely because of last December’s $31 billion surge, Fed Credit is up almost $70 billion, or 10.5%, from one year earlier.  Curiously, I still read capable analysts referring to the growth of Federal Reserve Credit as “the real inflation rate” and the “currency debasement rate” when it is clearly neither.  Such analysis misses the very essence of securities-based contemporary finance with its myriad institutions, Credit instruments/vehicles, and markets.

To come anywhere close to garnering insight as to what a true “currency debasement rate” might be, we must first look broadly to the growth (inflation) of new financial claims – Credit creation.  In this regard, it is worth noting that Total US Credit Market Debt Outstanding is up almost 50% since the beginning of 1998 to $31.7 Trillion.  This $10.4 Trillion increase in claims compares to the $235 billion (50%) increase in Federal Reserve Credit over the same period.  The US financial sector increased its liabilities (dollar claims) by $4.9 Trillion, or 90%, since the beginning of 1998, and will almost surely inflate liabilities by an additional $1 Trillion this year.  Today, one might look at the Fed’s tepid balance sheet growth and discern positive signs for the dollar, when in fact rampant “currency debasement” runs unabated with the inflation of dollar financial claims throughout the U.S. financial sector.

On a weekly basis I underscore the harsh reality that not only are we experiencing a seemingly everlasting inflation of dollar claims, but that these claims (primarily mortgage and consumption-based borrowings) are increasingly underpinned by little in the way of true economic wealth (non-productive Credit).  This, in a nutshell, is the essence of today’s intractable dollar dilemma.  The dynamics are analogous to the proliferation of initial public offerings - IPOs of increasingly dubious quality - at those fateful late (terminal) stages of equity bull markets.  Yet it is the seductive nature of runaway asset inflation that in the midst of heady price gains, near manic demand for these inflating assets can for sometime outstrip surging supply.  It is as if the immutable law of supply and demand is suspended for a period; and the longer this abeyance the greater the inflation of increasingly dubious claims.  But make no mistake, this suspension waits patiently for manic expectations and bull market extrapolations to be inevitably disappointed – for greed to commence its destined transformation to fear.  The consequent reversal of speculative flows then exposes the risks and vulnerabilities associated with the previous inflation of securities (many of suspect value), along with attendant distortions to supply, demand and pricing relationships.  The misery of the bear market takes over.

Importantly, the abrupt closing of the IPO spigot is a fundamental aspect of the marketplace’s self-correcting mechanism, working to bring the new supply/demand dynamics into better balance.  Traditionally, currency markets have operated under similar dynamics.  A reversal of speculative flows would see local central bankers tighten Credit conditions to constrain the creation of new claims and restrict liquidity (shut down the “IPO” machine).  It may prove quite painful, especially to highly leveraged players, exposed speculators, and vulnerable Bubble economies, but it is a central aspect of the inescapable adjustment process – adjusting to the new supply/demand constraints imposed by the bursting of a Credit/currency Bubble.  We have witnessed such dynamics repeatedly with the bursting of past Credit Bubbles in Mexico, SE Asia, Russia, Turkey, Argentina, etc.  In all instances – the Argentine experience providing the clearest example - the issue was the bursting of a Bubble of inflating broad financial claims (Credit creation), as opposed to (narrow) central bank Credit and/or government fiat currency.

But in the U.S. today something very different has set course.  Despite the inevitable bursting of the dollar bubble and the apparent reversal of speculative flows, the Federal Reserve is only more aggressively accommodating the unyielding inflation of dollar claims (running rampant throughout the financial sector).    A mighty bear market is slamming the dollar, yet the Fed steadfastly guarantees that the dollar claims “IPO spigot” will run wide open (with its endless torrent of “crummy deals”.)   This surely does keep liquidity flowing and the Credit Bubble inflating, but it also dangerously ignores the unfolding new reality.  Not only does this recklessly disregard developing (bear market) supply/demand constraints, it sets the stage for the inescapable devastating adjustment for both the Credit system (the creator of dollar claims) and the U.S. Bubble economy (addicted to inflating doses of new claims).  Postponing the Day of Reckoning is Central Banking at its Worst.  There must be some constraints placed on dollar debasement or a collapse in confidence will usher in irreparable global revulsion to dollar financial claims.  There is certainly no inflating away our currency problem.

Greenspan’s Wednesday “testimony” before the Joint Economic Committee was especially fascinating, if not constructive to dollar confidence.  I have included extensive quotes from the Q&A.  Mr. Greenspan again proved that he is lost in a sea of flawed reasoning and economic spin.  And our hero Dr. Ron Paul once more demonstrated that he is the only individual in Washington that is operating within a sound analytical framework and truly grasping the seriousness of key issues (dysfunctional monetary regimes, flawed central bank policies, the vulnerable dollar, etc.).  Mr. Greenspan went so far as to make the ridiculous claim that central banks “essentially have restrained the expansion of credit enough that many aspects of the gold standard, which induced deflationary patterns in past periods, had been replicated in our monetary systems.”  (Say what?)  Dr. Paul gets to the truth of the matter:  We deal in the world today with fluctuating exchange rates and all currencies are inflated at different rates… there is no soundness to it, no restraint on the monetary authorities.

And right in the thick of truly astounding mortgage finance excess, Mr. Greenspan fails to deliver even a word of caution.  Rather, he once again invokes the wonders of “technology” and innovation emanating from our contemporary Credit system and New Economy.  But how is it not possible for our leading financial authority to recognize the clear similarities between the forces fueling today’s mortgage boom and the “innovations” that fostered the lending and speculating excess that created recurring global Credit booms and busts, the telecom Bubble, and equity Bubbles just a few short years ago?  It doesn’t make any sense and lacks credibility, things that all the sudden do matter in The New Era of Faltering Dollar Confidence.

Alan Greenspan:  “…It’s important to recognize that a goodly part of the extraction of equity has been an ongoing issue related to a very high level of existing home sales, which has not deviated very much, as you well know, in recent quarters.  What has changed is a very extraordinary shift in the way the mortgage market functions…. Let me also point out that surveys by the Federal Reserve indicate that equity extraction from homes, especially refinancings - tend to be very significantly employed to repay other debt.  And first of all, they’re a major source of repayment on home equity loans, but they have also shown up as a major factor in reducing the burden of consumer debt. So all in all, it’s turning (out) that the technology, which is obviously at the base here of where this refinancing’s coming from, has changed the housing market in a rather fundamental – I should say, the financing of the housing market - and it has made it a vehicle for liquefying household wealth.  And it’s been a major factor in consumer activity.  And I might say to you that my suspicion is that it’s going to increase rather than decrease as a factor in the American consumer markets as home ownership continues to increase.” (Has our Fed chairman been chit-chatting with Franklin Raines?)
And Mr. Greenspan makes reference to the current “low risk” environment for implementing aggressive Federal Reserve accommodation. This is a view of a central banker fixated on “core” consumer prices, with the blinders fixed to avoid the ghastly sight of gross financial excess.  Mr. Greenspan speaks as if there are no risks or costs associated with ultra-easy monetary policies, when they are today expanding exponentially.  And yes, central bank interest-rate manipulation immediately affects our speculation-rife Credit market, but what are the long-term consequences of so abusing this mechanism?

Alan Greenspan:  “I still think that monetary policy should take the lead (over fiscal policy) in the short run, largely because we can move on 20 minutes’ notice in 10 minutes, if necessary, where that is obviously not feasible in the fiscal ring. Having made the judgments, then the question is, to do what. And there is the obvious problem of short-term fiscal stimulus which we could arrange.  In other words, you can get a very significant short-term surge, perhaps in retail sales, with a very marked short-term decline in taxes, for example.  The problem is that if you succeed, the difficulty is that it is short term and it tends to fade, and if it creates levels of production which reduce unemployment as a consequence, over time it reverses, and it’s not a longer-term phenomenon.”

My comment:  The use of aggressive “activist” monetary policy over an extended period categorically nurtures speculation, over-lending, asset Bubbles and generally dysfunctional Monetary Processes.  The risks and eventual cost of associated Credit Bubbles are manifestly greater than those engendered by fiscal deficits.  Importantly, an economy can be much more easily weaned from government deficits than they can from easy money, endemic asset inflation, highly leveraged financial systems, and all-encompassing Credit Bubbles.  Fiscal deficits tend to spread conventional inflation throughout the economy, not desirable but at least not unmanageable.  Conversely, perpetual monetary ease nurtures divergent inflationary manifestations that are more sectoral, uneven, destabilizing and uncontrollable for the financial system, economy and underlying currency.

Joint Economic Committee Chairman Senator Robert F. Bennett:  “Let me just ask two questions. Last November, when you were here, Mr. Chairman, we discussed the downward pressure on prices and options available to the Federal Reserve to combat it.  Yet some still seem to believe that low short-term interest rates limit the potency of monetary policy…  Could you explain how the Fed could address unwelcome downward pressures on prices through the purchase of long-term Treasury securities?”

Alan Greenspan:  “As I and a number of my colleagues have stated recently, we have chosen to act solely in overnight funds, essentially addressing the reserve balances of the banks.  There are a number of reasons why we did that, but the point at issue is that there is no legal requirement that we do so, nor indeed an economic one.  And should it turn out that, for reasons which we don’t expect, but we certainly are concerned may happen, the pressures on the short- term markets drive the federal funds rate down close to zero, that does not mean that the Federal Reserve is out of business on the issue of further easing and expansion of the monetary base.  We indeed, as you point out, can merely move out on the yield curve, because as you’re well aware, even though short-term rates are something slightly over 1 percent, longer-term rates are up significantly above that.  And we do have the capability, should that be necessary, of clearly moving out on the yield curve, essentially moving longer-term rates down and in the process expanding the monetary base and the degree of monetary stimulus.  And since there is such a significant amount of potential in that longer-maturity structure, we see no credible possibility that we will at any point, irrespective of what is required of us, run out of monetary ammunition to address problems of deflation or anything similar to that which disrupts our economy.”  (That could not have been clearer!)

Representative Ron Paul:  “Good morning, Mr. Greenspan. I have two questions.  One is generalized and it deals with the dollar system and the monetary system that you’re required to operate, and then one more specific, a factor that affects the strength of the dollar. But the big debate now in financial circles is the weak dollar, whether it’s good or bad, versus what a strong dollar should do to us, or for us.  And I would like to suggest that there should be another alternative rather than arguing a temporary case for a strong dollar to help us, which it seemed to in the latter part of the 1990s, versus whether the weak dollar will now help us on our exports.  Rather than this manipulation of the value of the dollar, I would hope someday that we will talk about a stable dollar, one that does not fluctuate so readily.  We deal in the world today with fluctuating exchange rates and all currencies are inflated at different rates, and nobody advocates that we have 50 different currencies in this country; that would be totally chaotic.  And yet the world is required to operate, and there is no soundness to it, no restraint on the monetary authorities. And the other challenge, I think, that we have to look at some day is whether we should continue to accept this notion that we can achieve positive central economic planning through the monopoly control of money and credit and setting of interest rates, which is really contradictory to true capitalism.  And I think that’s where part of our problem is.  The Austrian economists for years - Mises and Hayek and Rothbard - have argued that this is the source of our problem, that the manipulation of interest rates too low causes the boom, and then eventually the bust has to come.  And we see this over and over again, but we talk about productivity and other events that are important, but we fail to talk about the initial cause of the mal-investment, the overcapacity, which then requires the correction. Because we operate the reserve currency to the world, we have the advantage of others taking our money and our dollars and holding them. But currently the expectations are that our current account deficit may soar to $600 billion next year.  And we do know throughout history, and most economists agree, that these current account deficits cannot be maintained or it it’ll eventually lead to a weaker dollar and higher interest rates.   So I think you’re under the gun.  In one sense, you want to stimulate the economy with low interest rates, which weakens the dollar, at the same time the weak dollar will eventually push up the interest rates. And my question is when do you think, or do you think we will ever, talk once again about sound, stable currency?

And the other question is more specific, because even though what the Fed does in the creation of new money is the key element, other things do have factors.  The jawboning and the so-called speculators, for a day or two they have an effect, but they really can’t change it. Jawboning doesn’t work.  Ultimately, in 1979, interest rates had to go to 21 percent to restore some order to the dollar. But you talked about the war and the supposed benefits after the war was over and after it started, but I think what has not been recognized is the ongoing foreign policy of our adventurism and our plans, really - those same people who planned and argued the case for Iraq are arguing the case for Syria and they’re arguing the case for Iran.  At the same time we don’t have our allies close to us, we don’t have people pouring in the dollars like we did in the 1990s.  So that in itself has a subjective relationship to the perceived value of the dollar.  And I wanted to know whether or not you think that element in foreign policy today specifically has affected the future perceptions of what the dollar’s value is going to be.”
(Mr. Greenspan’s response was hopelessly inadequate at best, although I will include it below for the curious.)

Representative Paul Ryan:  “I’d like to put the word (deflation) right smack in the middle of the table and give you an opportunity to talk about it so that we can address the speculation, sometimes wild speculation, that has gone on in many of the columns that say, ‘We are on the verge of becoming Japan if we are not, in fact, Japan.  Greenspan warns of deflation.  And we’re looking at 10 years of falling prices and sluggish economy,’ and all of the rest of that. Can you just take that particular topic and deal with it in a way that we hope - I hope will put some of these specters to rest?”

Alan Greenspan:  “It’s a very serious issue and an issue which we at the Federal Reserve are paying extensive attention to.  And the reason basically - and this indeed follows on naturally from my conversation with Congressman Paul - with the elimination of the gold standard in the 1930s and the development essentially of worldwide fiat currencies, almost no economists believed that you could create deflation with fiat currencies because the ultimate supply of those currencies, by definition, comes from government fiat. We went through most of the post-World War II period with the expectation that fiat currencies were essentially inflation- ridden and that the major focus of central banks was to suppress inflation.  The notion that deflation would have emerged just never entered our minds until the Japanese demonstrated to us otherwise.”

(My comment:  It is imperative to move beyond a narrow focus on government issued fiat currency in order to comprehend the expansive nature of contemporary Credit inflation manifestations.)

Alan Greenspan:  “As a consequence of that, not having had any experience in the modern world with dealing with deflation and fiat currencies, our knowledge base was virtually non-existent, in the sense that we know how to deal with inflation.”

(My comment:  This clearly demonstrates a flawed analytical framework.  For too long the Fed and economics profession have seemly gone out of their way to ignore valuable lessons that could have been garnered from relevant financial Bubbles such as the Roaring Twenties, Japan, SE Asia and even going back to the John Law fiasco.  Financial history is replete with lessons that should have been learned.)

Alan Greenspan:  “Inflation, obviously, is something that for a half century we’ve been struggling with.  We know how to suppress it.  We know the consequences of suppressing it.  We know the impact of various monetary policy decisions on the levels of output growth and of unemployment.  So we are familiar with the mechanism. It’s not that we can very easily and automatically just suppress inflation; it has been a struggle of very great dimensions for most central banks in the world.  What’s happened now is that since I guess the middle of the 1990s, we’re beginning to see that it is possible for deflation to exist with a fiat currency, and in a way, it’s, I suspect, credit to central banks, which essentially have restrained the expansion of credit enough that many aspects of the gold standard, which induced deflationary patterns in past periods, had been replicated in our monetary systems and that, frankly, is quite good. We, at the Federal Reserve, recognize that deflation is a possibility.  Indeed, we now have been putting very significant resources in trying to understand, without actually seeing it happen, what this phenomena is all about. We cannot say that in the marketplace that there is a severe increasing concern of deflation.  Indeed, the various expectations of price by both business and consumers has been relatively flat for recent years, and the so-called TIPS inflation premium -- that is the implicit forecast of the consumers price index, which is embodied in our TIPS treasury yields - has not changed much over the last three or four years.  So this is not something which the markets are beginning to sense is about to erupt and something which we must address.

Nonetheless, even though we perceive the risks as minor, the potential consequences are very substantial and could be quite negative.  So we have created fairly significant resources to try to address this problem, increasing our knowledge of what actually happens, what’s the process and what tools are necessary to fend it off.  I think we’ve made very substantial progress in that intellectual endeavor. We do, obviously, have the problem that we never dealt with this before.  We know as a consequence that when we don’t deal with something, we have a large element of uncertainty, which strangely we do not have with the implementation of policies against inflation because we’ve dealt with it over so many decades.

We believe that because in the current environment the cost of taking out insurance against deflation is so low that we can aggressively attack some of the underlying forces, which are essential weak demand.  And indeed, we’ve done that since we started a very aggressive easing in monetary policy in early 2001.

Alan Greenspan: “So long as the costs of engaging disinflation are so low, we have moved fairly considerably and in statements we have made, specifically, as you point out, the statement we made at our last FOMC meeting, to recognize this not as an imminent, dangerous threat to the United States, but a threat that, even though minor, is sufficiently large that it does require very close scrutiny and maybe, maybe, action on the part of the central bank.
Ron Paul:  “Earlier we were talking about your (in)ability to talk about the value of the dollar and what it should be.  I find that rather ironic.  I mean, the Federal Reserve is in charge of the monetary system, and you, as chairman, have a lot to say about what monetary policy is and how much money will be printed and created and what interest rates would be.  So we find it a bit ironic that you can’t comment on the value of the dollar, and we defer to Treasury.  Now, Treasury can play a role, of course, by intervening in the exchange markets, but that’s very temporary.  But I understand the policy and we don’t expect you to change that, but in a way you’re really in charge, and it’s too bad that we can’t get comments about the dollar.  I did want to remind you about following up on the question about foreign policy - how foreign policy anticipation of what we might be doing around the world might affect fiscal and monetary policy and trade policy, how that might affect perceptions of the dollar and whether or not that’s important.  But on the currency issue, I’m still not interested in going back to fixed currency rates, such as the Bretton Woods Agreement. That’s not my interest.  Because even then Henry Hazlitt, I remember, wrote very correctly back then that Bretton Woods would break down, and it certainly did break down, it didn’t work with that so-called gold exchange standard.

But if you have achieved what you hope you have achieved, and that is that central banks now have done such a good job in managing paper money that it’s starting to act like a gold standard - now, that would be an historic achievement, you realize that, because it has not been done in 6,000 years of recorded history.  And history’s on my side of this argument, in that paper money doesn’t work very well.  Paper money ends badly. And we may be seeing some signs today around the world that paper money is a very shaky system.  But a more specific question dealing with that in a return to commodity money, at least on a voluntary basis, if we have a Third World nation that destroys its currency and they don’t have the advantages that we have politically, if they destroy their currency and they want to link their currency to gold because they know history, they’re not allowed to do it.  The IMF prevents them from doing it.  There’s an IMF rule that says you can’t do it.  So wouldn’t this be a good time for us to become more neutral and not antagonistic toward gold and say to the IMF and to our position that, ‘If you choose to go back and get stability and soundness to your currency with a linkage to gold, we ought to permit that?’”

Senator Paul Sarbanes:  “On the trade deficit question -- of course, we now have this fall in the value of the dollar.  How long can we go on running these large trade deficits and building up these very significant claims abroad on our productive capacity?”

Alan Greenspan:  “Senator, as you well know, the issue of how much you can build up net claims against American residents is a function of not only - and this looks at a large function – of the willingness of foreigners to hold and seek those claims.  And indeed, what we have found over the years is that when the exchange rate for the dollar is rising, it, of necessity, means that there is a greater demand for dollars, and that’s what occurred during a significant part of the 1990s. But the obvious problem that you raise is, over the very long run, the ratio of cumulated claims against the United States, more specifically those which relate to debt, create interest charges which, in turn, are part of the current account deficit, which means that it is quite possible to get into an unstable equilibrium.”

(My comment:  If Mr. Greenspan believes escalating interest charges is the chief issue he is clearly mistaken.  Today’s “unstable equilibrium” is associated with Credit Bubble dynamics.  The U.S. Credit system and Bubble economy require unrelenting lending, financial leveraging, and speculating excesses - the rampant liquidity that is at the same time creating an unmanageable accumulation of dollar assets globally.  It is “unstable” precisely because it is unsustainable.)

Alan Greenspan:  “And that’s an issue which economists have discussed quite significantly with respect to the United States.  And as I think I’ve mentioned to you, Senator, I’ve been raising this issue for years and forecasting a major contraction eventually of the current account deficit, and I raise it every five years.  I’ve been wrong every five years.”

Senator Paul Sarbanes:  “I know, but if we ever hit it, it almost would be like falling off the cliff, would it not?
Alan Greenspan:  “No.  I would think not, largely because the stock of dollar assets is so huge and the ability to move them around is fairly limited, that I think adjustments don’t occur off the cliff… The question is, what do the holders do with those assets? They’re so heavily involved in dollar-denominated claims that while obviously they can move out of them, and would, there are limits to how fast these things tend to move.”
So we are to be comforted by the fact that foreign central banks have accumulated such “huge” dollar asset holdings that they have today little opportunity to sell.  This Financial Twilight Zone becomes only more bizarre and harrowing by the week.




Alan Greenspan’s response to Dr. Ron Paul’s first question:  “Well, Dr. Paul, first, let me address the last question first.  As I think you may remember that we in the United States government have made a decision in which the value of the American currency will be discussed only by our chief economic spokesman, which is the secretary of the Treasury.  And we at the Fed have adhered to that for quite a good, long period of time and think it’s important to have one voice speaking on that issue. With respect to the more general question about the issue of sound, stable currencies, this, as you know, is a very fundamental debate amongst economists. You point out quite correctly that there is a single currency in the 50 states of the United States.  The reason why we were able to function in a manner which others are not is that an exchange rate that is a unit-specific currency tends to bring together all of the imbalances in an economy in the exchange rate’s price.  In other words, at the border the exchange rate essentially rebalances all of the imbalances between two contiguous countries or it might have been in the United States between two states. If you lock the currency in and you cannot adjust the currency at the border, then the adjustments must occur in capital flows or in labor flows; the only two other ways in which you can get major adjustments that are required between two disequilibrium economies.

The advantage of the United States is that, because we have stripped out all barriers to interstate commerce essentially - I should say most - we are able to get equilibria adjusted solely through capital and labor market flows and we have a fixed currency. The reason why it is not, at this moment, feasible in a lot of other areas of the world is that capital and labor flows are not adequate to pick up the full adjustment process.  And an endeavor to fix exchange rates in the face of imbalances induces financial breakdowns has occurred.”
   
Representative Ron Paul:  “May I just interject?  I’m not talking about fixing these rates.  I’m talking about a single currency that could be universalized.”

Alan Greenspan:  “That’s the algebraic equivalent of fixing rates. In other words, if you lock in legally all rates, it’s irrelevant what you call the currency in one nation and another; it's the lock that matters.  And if you have, for example, as we did, the gold standard, which for a very substantial period of time was the single currency of the world, it didn’t matter what you called the other currencies, because they were all locked-in in units of gold.  And so the notion of a stable world currency requires a degree of flexibility in capital and labor flows, which we have not yet achieved.”