|    Equities   are trading unimpressively.  For the week, the Dow dropped 1.5% and the   S&P500 fell 1.0%.  Economically sensitive issues were on the   defensive.  The Transports declined 1.4%, and the Morgan Stanley   Cyclical index fell 1.5%.  The Utilities gained 1.5%, while the Morgan   Stanley Consumer index declined 1.2%.  The broader market held together   better than the major averages.  The small cap Russell 2000 dipped 0.6%,   and the S&P400 Mid-cap index declined 0.7%.  Technology stocks were   generally lower.  The NASDAQ100 declined 0.9% and the Morgan Stanley   Technology index fell 1.2%.  The Semiconductors, however, rose 0.4%.    The Street.com Internet Index dropped 1.6% and the NASDAQ Telecommunications   index dipped 0.7%.  Financial stocks lagged.  The Broker/Dealers   declined 1.6%, and the Banks were hit for 2.5%.  Although bullion gained   $1.40, the HUI gold index fell almost 3%. The   yield curve is getting quite flat.  For the week, two-year Treasury   yields rose 5 basis points to 4.06%, and five-year government yields added   one basis point to 4.08%.  At the same time, ten-year Treasury yields   fell 3 basis points for the week, to 4.18%.  Long-bond yields also   declined 3 basis points, to 4.38%.  The spread between 2 and 10-year   government yields sank 8 to a mere 12.  Benchmark Fannie Mae MBS yields   were unchanged, again underperforming the hot 10-year Treasury note. The   spread (to 10-year Treasuries) on Fannie’s 4 5/8% 2014 note widened 0.5 basis   points to 30.5, and the spread on Freddie’s 5% 2014 note widened one basis   point to 31.  The 10-year dollar swap spread declined 0.5 to 44.25.    Corporate bond spreads were largely unchanged.  Junk bond spreads were   also little changed. The implied yield on 3-month December Eurodollars rose 3   basis points to 4.315%, while December ’06 Eurodollar yields jumped 4.5 basis   points to 4.495%.      Corporate   issuance fell to summer doldrums $5.4 billion.  This week’s investment   grade issuers included Wal-Mart $2.5 billion, MBIA $900 million, Sovereign   Bancorp $500 million, John Deere $300 million, and Idaho Power $60 million.        Junk   bond funds reported inflows of $9 million (from AMG).  Junk issuers   included National Power Corp $400 million, MGM $375 million, and Station   Casinos $150 million.      Convert   issuers included WebMD $300 million. Japanese   10-year JGB yields slipped one basis point this week to 1.40%.  Emerging   debt markets generally performed well.  Brazil’s benchmark dollar bond   yields declined 2 basis points to 8.03%.  Mexican govt. yields fell 5   basis points to 5.38%.  Russian 10-year dollar Eurobond yields declined   2 basis points to 6.18%.   Freddie   Mac posted 30-year fixed mortgage rates slipped 3 basis points to 5.80%, with   a two-week decline of 12 basis points (down 5 bps from one year ago).    Fifteen-year fixed mortgage rates fell 5 basis points to 5.35%, a four-week   low.  One-year adjustable rates dipped 2 basis points to 4.56%, up 51   basis points from the year ago level.  The Mortgage Bankers Association   Purchase Applications Index dipped 2.2%.  Purchase applications were   about 11% ahead of the year ago level, with dollar volume up almost 26%.    Refi applications added 1.2%.  The average new Purchase mortgage was   unchanged at $243,000, while the average ARM slipped to $356,200.  The   percentage of ARMs dipped to 28.1% of total applications.     Broad   money supply (M3) surged $33.4 billion to a record $9.812 Trillion (week of   August 15).  Year-to-date, M3 has expanded at a 5.5% rate, with M3-less   Money Funds expanding at a 7.0% pace.  M3 has expanded $186.9 billon   over the past 13 weeks, or 7.8% annualized.  For the week, Currency   added $1.6 billion.  Demand & Checkable Deposits rose $6.7 billion.    Savings Deposits declined $5.0 billion, while Small Denominated Deposits   gained $3.6 billion.  Retail Money Fund deposits dipped $2.1 billion,   and Institutional Money Fund deposits fell $4.7 billion.  Large   Denominated Deposits surged $28.2 billion, with a y-t-d gain of $175.6 billion   (25.6% annualized).  For the week, Repurchase Agreements added $0.3   billion, and Eurodollar deposits expanded $5.0 billion.                 Bank   Credit added $1.4 billion last week.  Year-to-date, Bank Credit has   expanded $552 billion, or 12.9% annualized.  Securities Credit rose $8.1   billion during the week, with a year-to-date gain of $142.3 billion (11.7%   ann.).  Loans & Leases have expanded at a 13.7% pace so far during   2005, with Commercial & Industrial (C&I) Loans up an annualized 18.6%.    For the week, C&I loans gained $7.4 billion, while Real Estate loans   declined $4.3 billion.  Real Estate loans have expanded at a 15.8%   rate during the first 33 weeks of 2005 to $2.80 Trillion.  Real   Estate loans were up $378 billion, or 15.6%, over the past 52 weeks.    For the week, Consumer loans added $1.0 billion, while Securities loans   dropped $5.8 billion. Other loans fell $5.0 billion.    Total   Commercial Paper dipped $1.6 billion last week to $1.586 Trillion.  Total   CP has expanded $172.6 billion y-t-d, a rate of 18.7% (up 16.6% over the past   52 weeks).  Financial CP slipped $0.9 billion last week to $1.445   Trillion, with a y-t-d gain of $161 billion (19.2% ann.).  Non-financial   CP declined $0.7 billion to $141.1 billion (up 13.7% ann. y-t-d and 9.0% over   52 wks). ABS   issuance this week slowed to $13 billion (from JPMorgan).  Year-to-date   issuance of $485 billion is 21% ahead of comparable 2004.  Home Equity   Loan ABS issuance of $313 billion is 25% above comparable 2004.  Fed   Foreign Holdings of Treasury, Agency Debt declined $2.5 billion to $1.466   Trillion for the week ended August 24.  “Custody” holdings are up $130   billion y-t-d, or 14.9% annualized (up $188bn, or 14.7%, over 52 weeks).    Federal Reserve Credit fell $2.3 billion to $791.4 billion.  Fed Credit   has expanded 0.2% annualized y-t-d (up $36.2bn, or 4.8%, over 52 weeks).     International   reserve assets (excluding gold) - as accumulated by Bloomberg’s Alex Tanzi -   were up $602 billion, or 18.2%, over the past 12 months to $3.906 Trillion.  “Eurosystem”   reserve assets declined 1.4% over the past year to $173.8 billion. Currency Watch: August   25 – Bloomberg (Christina Soon and Yumi Kuramitsu):  “Indonesia’s rupiah   fell to the lowest level in 3 1/2 years after oil prices surged to a record,   adding to concern the government of Southeast Asia’s largest economy is   losing investors’ confidence. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono yesterday   said he will work with the central bank to curb the slide after the currency   had its biggest drop in 15 months.” The   dollar index declined 0.75% this week.  On the upside, the Brazil real   gained 1.9%, the Norwegian krone 1.7%, the Swedish krona 1.5%, the Iceland   krona 1.4%, and the Swiss franc 1.3%%.  On the downside, the Indonesian   rupiah sank 3.8%, the Jamaican dollar 1.0%, the Israeli shekel 0.9%, and the   Mexican peso 0.7%.       Commodities Watch: October   crude oil rose 34 cents to $66.13.  For the week, the CRB index added   0.6%, increasing y-t-d gains to 11.7%.  The Goldman Sachs Commodities   index jumped 2.2%, with 2005 gains rising to 40.7%.   Sugar rose   yesterday to a 7-year high. August 26 – Financial Times (Haig Simonian): “Before reaching for that chocolate bar for comfort from the prospect of ever higher oil prices, spare a thought for the ingredients. The price of many commodities used by leading confectionery and snacks groups, such as Nestlé, Kraft and PepsiCo, have been soaring through an unusual mixture of poor harvests and politics. Almonds, particularly popular in US snacks and confectioneries, have more than doubled in price to $8,400 a tonne in the past two years. Cocoa beans have soared from £600 a tonne to £1,647. But nothing matches the humble hazelnut. ‘I visit growers many times each year. But in all my career I’ve never seen anything like what’s happened to hazelnuts,’ says Rosanno Barbieri, a buyer for Nestlé, the world’s biggest foods group. Prices have risen more than fivefold from about $2,150 a tonne two years ago to a peak of $11,120 earlier this year… ‘Nobody expected this. Prices were already at a record level because of a bad harvest in 2003,’ says Peter Etter, a trader at Barry Callebaut, the world’s biggest chocolate maker.’” China Watch: August   22 – XFN:  “China’s industrial firms’ profits rose 20.6% to 743.7 bln   yuan in the first seven months, the National Bureau of Statistics said…That   compares with an increase of 19.1% in the first six months of this year and   39.7% for the same period last year.” August   26 – Bloomberg (Yanping Li):  “The Chinese government’s revenue rose 15   percent year on year to 1.94 trillion yuan ($239 billion) in the first seven   months of this year, state-run Xinhua News Agency reported. Expenditures   increased by 15 percent during the same period…” August   25 – Bloomberg (Koh Chin Ling):  “China’s cost of importing crude oil in   July rose 61 percent to $4.2 billion… The country spent $25.8 billion on oil   imports in the first seven months, 45 percent more than a year earlier… China’s   oil imports in July rose 15 percent to 11.1 million metric tons…” August   24 – Merrill Lynch Research:  “Hong Kong is headed for a multi-year   trend of accelerating inflation, in our view. We expect inflation to hit 6.5%   by end-2007.  The main reason: rising factor costs (rent and wages), as   well as a long-run depreciation of the Hong Kong dollar…” August   26 – Bloomberg (Philip Lagerkranser):  “Hong Kong’s exports reached a   record in July as the city’s sea and air ports shipped more Chinese-made   toys, computers and clothing abroad.  Overseas sales increased 8.1   percent from a year earlier to $25.5 billion,,,” August   22 – Bloomberg (Joshua Fellman):  “Hong Kong’s real estate transactions   will probably jump to 140,000 this year, the most since 1997 when about   180,000 units changed hands, the Standard said…” Asia Boom Watch: August   22 – Bloomberg (Theresa Tang):  “Taiwan’s unemployment rate fell to a   four-year low in July as expansion by companies including Taiwan   Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. created jobs. The seasonally adjusted   jobless rate fell to 4.15 percent…” August   25 – Bloomberg (James Peng):  “Taiwan’s money supply grew in July at the   fastest pace this year as foreign funds bought more local assets, the central   bank… M2, the broadest measure of the island’s money supply, rose 6.5 percent   from a year earlier after increasing 6.3 percent in June…” August   25 – Bloomberg (Stephanie Phang):  “Malaysia’s economy grew in the   second quarter at its slowest pace in more than three years as factories cut   production of semiconductors and building materials.  Southeast Asia’s   third-largest economy grew 4.1 percent in the three months ended June,   compared with a revised 5.8 percent expansion in the first quarter…” Unbalanced Global Economy Watch: August   23 – Bloomberg (Lindsay Whipp):  “Japan’s services industries expanded   in June, as consumers spent more on Internet services and in shops,   suggesting the world’s second-biggest economy may sustain a recovery from   last year’s recession. The tertiary index, a gauge of demand for services   that make up about 60 percent of the economy, increased 1 percent from a   month earlier…” August   26 – Bloomberg (Simone Meier):  “Money supply growth in the dozen   countries sharing the euro unexpectedly gained at the fastest pace since   October 2003 in July, increasing pressure on the European Central Bank to   raise borrowing costs from a six-decade low. M3, the ECB’s measure of   money supply, accelerated to a 7.9 percent increase from a year earlier   after a revised 7.6 percent expansion in June…” August   23 – Bloomberg (Matthew Brockett):  “Germany’s domestic economy expanded   in the second quarter for the first time in nine months as company investment   rose, adding to signs that growth may accelerate in the second half. Domestic   demand, which combines consumer, government and corporate spending, rose 0.3   percent from the first quarter…” August   24 – Bloomberg (Brian Swint and Matthew Brockett):  “Import prices in   Germany, Europe’s largest economy, rose at the fastest pace in more than four   years in July as oil prices surged. Import prices rose 4.7 percent from a   year earlier, the fastest rate since January 2001…” August   25 – Bloomberg (Victoria Batchelor):  “Australian construction work   completed in the second quarter unexpectedly increased, driven by the largest   gain in commercial building work in eight years. Construction work done in   the three months ended June 30 rose 4 percent from the previous quarter, the   largest gain since the fourth quarter of 2003…” Latin America Watch: August   25 – Bloomberg (Patrick Harrington):  “Mexican retail sales rose at a   faster pace in June than in the previous month…  Retail sales increased   6 percent from the year-earlier period after rising 3.7 percent in May…” August   23 – Bloomberg (Matthew Walter):  “Chile, the world’s biggest copper   producer, said economic growth picked up in the second quarter as the country   benefited from record prices for the metal. Chile’s gross domestic product   grew 6.5 percent, after expanding a revised 6.1 percent in the first quarter…” August   23 – Bloomberg (Alex Emery):  “Peru’s July exports rose to a record of   $1.49 billion, spurred by U.S. and Chinese purchases of copper, gold and   fishmeal. Exports rose 32.5 percent…” Bubble Economy Watch: August   23 – Bloomberg (Danny King):  “U.S. retail sales for the back-to-school   season may increase as much as 18 percent from a year earlier to $34 billion   as students buy more denim items and electronic goods, the New York Times   reported. ” August   22 – The Asian Wall Street Journal (Christine Haughney):  “Australian   pension funds are snapping up U.S. commercial real estate, adding heat to a   steamy market.   In the past 12 months, Australians have purchased   $6.8 billion of American office buildings, shopping centers and other   commercial properties, according to Real Capital Analytics. During that   period, Australians accounted for 37% of the international capital that   poured into U.S. real estate, the New York research firm says.” Speculator Watch: August   25 – New York Times (Riva D. Atlas):  “The Federal Reserve Bank of New   York has called a meeting of top Wall Street firms to discuss practices in   the booming, if opaque, credit derivatives market. Credit derivatives, which   are linked to the probability of a company’s paying its debts, represent one   of Wall Street’s fastest-growing businesses, with $8.4 trillion of these   contracts outstanding at the end of last year, up from $919 billion just   three years earlier…  The meeting, which will be held on Sept. 15, is   being called three months after global stock and bond markets were rattled by   fears that some of the largest banks were caught wrong-footed on some credit   derivatives bets."  California Bubble Watch: From   the California Association of Realtors:  “July’s increase in the median   price of a home followed the trend we’ve experienced for most of this year.    Mortgage interest rates remain lower than a year ago and the inventory of   homes for sale has improved slightly compared to the historic lows of 2004.    Both the national and state economies are doing better than a year ago, and   household incomes are improving.  These are all contributing to the   continued strength of the housing market in California.” California   Median Home Prices slipped slightly from June’s record to $540,900.    Median Prices were up 17.1% ($79,140) from one year ago, with an 18-month   gain of 42% ($158,960).  Median Prices are up 68% ($219,000) over three   years and 145% ($320,370) in six years.  California Condo Prices rose   $1,000 during July to a record $426,320.  Condo Prices have jumped 41%   ($123,260) in 18 months, 71% ($177,430) over three years, and 152% ($257,150)   over six years. Mortgage Finance Bubble Watch: Total   July Home Sales were up 7.9% from July 2004 to an 8.57 million annualized   pace, second only to June’s record 8.674 million level.  Annualized   Calculated Transaction Value (CTV) was up 16.3% from July 2004.    Year-to-date Total Home Sales are running 6.6% ahead of last year’s record   pace.  July New Home Sales were up 28% from one year ago to a   stronger-than-expected and record 1.41 million annualized pace.  Average   (mean) prices, however, dipped 1.5% from the year ago level to $275,000.    Existing Home Sales were up 4.7% from one year ago to a robust 7.16 million   annualized pace.  Average Prices (mean) were up 9.5% to a record   $266,100.  Average Existing Home Prices were up 20% over two years, 28%   over three years, and 55% over six years.  The inventory of unsold   Existing Homes was up 6.8% over the past year to 2.35 million, while the   inventory of New Homes jumped 15% to 460,000. August   23 – Florida Association of Realtors:  “The frenzied pace of existing   home sales in Florida eased in July, while the statewide median sales price rose 33 percent to $252,300…. A year ago, the statewide median price was $190,300; in July 2000, the statewide median price was $119,600… A total of 21,669 existing single-family homes changed hands…declining 8 percent compared to 23,646 homes sold in July 2004.” August   25 – The Wall Street Journal (Christine Haughney):  “The growing   popularity of interest-only loans has already raised eyebrows in the   residential market -- it is seen as a sign that buyers may be stretching   themselves too thin to purchase homes they otherwise couldn’t afford. Now, an   increasing number of commercial real-estate buyers are following that lead,   using interest-only loans to snap up far-larger properties, from skyscrapers   to shopping centers.  According to a recent report from ratings agency   Moody’s…65% of the U.S. commercial loans that it rated in the second   quarter were interest-only for part or all of the loan’s term.” August   25 – The Wall Street Journal (Ruth Simon, James R. Hagerty and James T.   Areddy):  “Strong demand for mortgage-backed securities from investors   world-wide is allowing American lenders to make more loans -- and riskier   ones -- in a way that is helping prolong the boom in U.S. house prices.    The cash pouring in -- not only from U.S. investors but increasingly from   Europe and Asia -- keeps stoking the housing market even as the [Fed]   continues to raise interest rates, normally something that damps home prices.   The market has shown a few signs of slowing recently, and talk of a bubble   has grown louder, but prices continue to rise or remain at lofty levels as   investors continue to gobble up mortgage-backed securities and banks keep   lending. ‘As the Fed has tightened, lenders have eased’ terms for   borrowers, says Mark Zandi, chief economist at Economy.com…” August 25 – New York Times   (David Leonhardt):  “Rents are rising again across the country,   squeezing tenants who are already coping with high gasoline prices and   improving returns to landlords after a deep five-year slump.  The   turnaround appears to be another sign that the boom in house prices and sales   is finally slowing, as homes have become so expensive in many metropolitan   areas that some people have decided to rent instead.  …Rents have   clearly changed direction, even if the increases have been relatively small.   With the economy growing and mortgage rates inching up, more people are   looking to rent apartments and homes rather than buy them. At the same time,   many buildings are being turned into condominiums, reducing the supply of   rental property.” The Greenspan Era:  Lessons to be Learned   in the Future: This   weekend’s global central banker powwow at Jackson Hole sets off what will   surely be at least five months of Greenspan – “the greatest central banker of   all-time” - pomp and adulation.  I will anxiously await the public   release of this weekend’s papers from “The Greenspan Era:  Lessons   Learned.”  They will be worth storing away for later reflection.    His legacy has already become favored pundit subject matter, although I find   much of the commentary misplaced.   No   discussion of Greenspan’s possible legacy will stand the test of time without   addressing the momentous financial sector developments nurtured under his   watch.  Ultimately, I expect that he will be judged most by the success   or failure of the Financial Sphere he cultivated, sustained and endorsed.    Curiously, I have yet to read or listen to any comments regarding the   unprecedented buildup of debt under The Greenspan Regime.  He has   operated for too long as undisputed Master and Commander of what has evolved   into today’s massive and unwieldy global pool of speculative finance.    Disconcertingly, his impending exit will coincide with increasingly   vulnerable U.S. Mortgage Finance and Credit Bubbles. Under   Mr. Greenspan’s watch, Total US Credit Market Debt (TCMD) ballooned from   (using year-end 1986) $9.8 Trillion to $37.3 Trillion (380%).  As a   percentage of GDP, TCMD expanded from 220% to 318%.  Rest of World (ROW)   holdings of US Financial Assets increased from $1.18 Trillion to $9.72   Trillion, or 826%.  ROW holdings of US Credit Instruments increased 900%   to $4.88 Trillion, including holdings of GSE securities which grew from $22   billion to $826 billion.   During Chairman Greenspan's   tenure, Commercial Bank Assets expanded 332% to $8.713 Trillion, including a   624% increase in Mortgages.  The Bank Asset “Security Credit” expanded   475% to $216 billion.  The Liability “Fed Funds/Repo” increased 500% to   $1.023 Trillion, while Deposits expanded 270% to $5.14 Trillion.  Over   this period, M3 Money supply inflated 280%.  When it comes to Greenspan’s   legacy, one must note that Total Mortgage Debt expanded 404% to $10.774   Trillion, with Home Mortgage borrowings up 480% to $8.282 Trillion.     No   group has so luxuriated in Mr. Greenspan’s leadership than Wall Street.    Security Broker/Dealer Assets have increased more than ten-fold, from $185   billion to $1.941 Trillion.  Broker/Dealer holdings of Credit Market   Instruments jumped from $66 billion to $443 billion (670%).  On the   Liability side, Security Repos ballooned from $36 billion to $623 billion.    Security Credit jumped from $84 billion to $777 billion.  Almost   walking distance from the Marriner S. Eccles Federal Reserve Board Building,   Fannie and Freddie perpetrated one of history’s greatest Credit expansions.    On Greenspan’s watch, GSE Assets ballooned 830%, from $346 billion to $2.872   Trillion.  Agency MBS (some included in GSE assets) surged 670% to $3.55   Trillion.  Outstanding ABS exploded from $75 billion to today’s more   than $2.70 Trillion (and counting!).  I saw no indication that Greenspan   had any problem with the GSEs when they operated as marketplace liquidity   backstops in 1994, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002, emboldening the   blossoming speculator community in the process.  Allowing GSE debt and   MBS liabilities to surpass $6 Trillion is at or near the top of a list of   serious blunders unbefitting of a lionized chief central banker.       When   attempting today to gauge his legacy, it is fundamental to appreciate that   there was a momentous transformation of finance, at home and then   abroad, under Greenspan’s prolonged reign.  Not since Benjamin Strong   (in the 1920s) has one man’s ideas, brilliance, personality, and   personalization of policy had such a profound impact on the nature of   financial (and, thus, economic) activities.  It is no exaggeration to   state that Alan Greenspan is the father of “contemporary Wall Street finance,”   having nurtured and accommodated a marketable securities-based Credit system   from its infancy some 18 years ago.  The loan officer, banking system,   and borrowing for business investment were supplanted as the prominent   creators of finance by a New Paradigm securities, "structured   finance", and asset-based lending financial apparatus.  At the   same time, Fed open-market operations and bank reserve requirements were   relinquished as purveyors of system liquidity.  The benign bank loan was   cast out as an anachronism, replaced by myriad dynamic and “sophisticated”   securities, instruments, derivative contracts, and leveraged speculation.    The US securities markets evolved into The Global Fountainhead of Liquidity   Overabundance.   The   Greenspan Federal Reserve’s move to transparently pegging short-term   interest-rates – slashing them aggressively to mollify heightened   systemic stress, while invoking market-pleasing gradualism when moderating accommodation   – played a profound role in mitigating the risk of leveraged Credit market   and asset speculation.  The upshot was an energized Credit system with a   powerful expansionary (inflationary) bias, as well as a financial system and   economy relatively easily stimulated by rate cuts and public assurances.    The downside of such a haphazard policy “regime” is that at some point along   the way it becomes virtually impossible to face the consequences of taking   away the punchbowl.      In   today’s Jackson Hole speech, Mr. Greenspan stated, “The Federal Reserve   System was created in 1913 to counter the recurrent credit stringencies that   had so frequently been experienced in earlier decades.”  From my reading   of history, recurring Credit-induced booms and busts were the impetus for the   creation of a U.S. central bank.  The Federal Rerserve System was   organized specifically to undertake the regulation of Credit, most   importantly acting against the propensity for unchecked finance to propagate   speculative Bubbles and their inevitable agonizing busts.  It was not   until later, under New York Fed President Strong, that a more activist   approach to countering “stringencies” and sustaining prosperity was deemed   operative.   Many   are today comparing Mr. Greenspan to the legendary central banker William   McChesney Martin.  Well, I have read much about Mr. Martin, his   distinguished career, his statesmanship, and his unassailable integrity.  I   feel as if I have come to know him – Bill Martin is a friend of mine.    Mr. Greenspan is no McChesney Martin. The essence of Chairman Martin –   exemplifying the worthy tradition of central bankers generally – is one of   conservatism (in the monetary sense) and caution.  Mr. Martin was a   straight-talker and sincere public servant and statesman.  He erred on   the side of prudence and stability. Truth   be told, Mr. Greenspan is a monetary policy radical.  He presided over   the greatest expansion of speculative finance in history, including a   Trillion dollar hedge fund community, bloated Wall Street firm balance sheets   approaching $2 Trillion, a $3.3 Trillion repo market, and a global   derivatives market surpassing an unfathomable $220 Trillion.  During the   late-nineties, when leveraged speculation was heavily infiltrating the   financial system, he became the leading proponent of the “New Economy.”    He became a powerful advocate of derivatives and Wall Street finance, all the   time avoiding any discussion of the impact these new financial instruments   and practices were having on Credit growth, marketplace risk perceptions,   speculation, asset prices and the underlying structure of the economy.   Greenspan   has stood idly as our Current Account Deficit has ballooned to almost $800   billion annually, with foreign central banks accumulating several Trillion   dollars of claims on our economy.  He watches as crude approaches $70.    And now he warns us against the scourge of “protectionism,” an inevitable   response to the gross global imbalances his activist inflationary policies   have fostered.  He ignored the most reckless of mortgage lending   Bubbles, and now warns us that prices, market liquidity and   wealth/income ratios may not be sustainable.  Worse yet, he is arguably   guilty of committing the ultimate in central banker derelictions by targeting   household mortgage borrowings as the primary mechanism for his   post-technology Bubble “reflationary” policies (policy error begetting ugly   error).  The “greatest central banker” incited history’s greatest real   estate borrowing and speculating Bubble, a legacy our financial system and   economy will have to live with for decades. There   is today a joyous consensus view that Greenspan’s policy of not preempting   asset Bubbles as they inflate - but rather being well-prepared to act   aggressively when they burst - is pure policymaker genius.  Well, bull   markets do fashion abundant “genius.” Let there be no doubt, however, that   the inevitable housing bear/bust will expose the grievous policy flaw of   mitigating one Bubble by inciting an only larger one.  Greenspan’s use   of the leveraged speculating community as a policy tool was also a grave   mistake.  There will come a day of policy reckoning. I   earlier today watched former Fed Vice-Chair Alan Blinder on Bloomberg   television responding to a question in Jackson Hole: “Has Greenspan been   lucky or good?”  Dr. Blinder, answering reasonably, stated that while   Greenspan has enjoyed his fair share of luck, it is too much to Credit good   fortune for 18 years of success.  Good enough.  But I do believe   strongly that the secret to Mr. Greenspan’s “success” has been the Financial   Sphere’s capacity for uninterrupted (and previously unimaginable) Credit   expansion.  While our Fed chairman avoids the important issues related   to Credit growth and excess, not for a moment does he take his eye off the   ball.  Greenspan can Credit the economy’s flexibility and resiliency,   but the reality of the situation is that our Fed Chairman has relished in his   capacity over 18 years to sustain both Credit expansion and speculative   excess.  I believe this extraordinary power has much more to do with the   epic “Wall Street finance” Credit boom than it does with adept policymaking.  In   so many ways, Chairman Greenspan’s legacy is conjoined with Wall Street   Finance.  Does “structured finance” work over the long-term, or are a   Trillion dollar hedge fund community, $3 Trillion of ABSs, upwards of $6   Trillion of GSE exposure, and $220 Trillion of derivatives the residual of   the type of crazy Credit Bubbles that have occurred every once in awhile   throughout financial history?   Will derivative hedging and   dynamic trading strategies function as expected during the inevitable bouts   of financial stress, dislocation, deleveraging and panic?  And what is   the prognosis after a doubling of mortgage debt in seven years, with all the   attendant financial excesses and economic distortions?  The   Achilles heel of such a highly leveraged, speculative and liquidity-dependent   marketable securities-based Credit system is the necessity for uninterrupted   liquidity and “continuous” market trading/pricing.  Mr. Greenspan   provided both positive assurances and the marketplace liquidity backdrop.    In a system that creates increasingly untenable systemic risk that is amassed   by highly leveraged speculators, it was Greenspan the convincing salesmen   that could extol the virtues of “unbundling” and transferring risk to “those   most able to manage it.”  But can they?  Ironically, it is his   cleverly crafted “risk management” policy approach - not surprisingly, given   significant billing in today’s speech – that many view as the culmination of   his years of accomplished policymaking.  “Given   our inevitably incomplete knowledge about key structural aspects of an   ever-changing economy and the sometimes asymmetric costs or benefits of   particular outcomes, the paradigm on which we have settled has come to   involve, at its core, crucial elements of risk management. In this approach, a   central bank needs to consider not only the most likely future path for the   economy but also the distribution of possible outcomes about that path. The   decision makers then need to reach a judgment about the probabilities, costs,   and benefits of various possible outcomes under alternative choices for   policy.” The   eventual failure of such ostensibly sound policy doctrine is dictated by   Credit and speculative dynamics.  In The Age of Securities-based Credit   Systems, when Bubbles become pronounced – significantly impacting financial   stability and economic vulnerability – policymakers will naturally view the   cost of a bursting as unacceptably high (Dr. Bernanke going so far as to ridicule   the “Bubble poppers”).  Policy mistakes will tend to elicit additional   compounding errors, and there will be over time a tendency to condone excess   and pander to the powerful securities trading community.  There is,   then, in discretionary “risk management-based” decisionmaking, a dangerous   propensity to act in a manner that nurtures catastrophic Bubbles.  Or,   in a metaphor Mr. Greenspan was known to employ back in the 1960s when he   discussed causes of the Great Depression, there is a strong predilection for   the Fed to repeatedly place “Coins in the Fuse-box.”  It is his   incomparable aptitude - as the Master of Where, When and How Aggressively to   Place the Coins - that is most deserving of his legacy. And,   in regard to Lessons to be Learned, at the top of the list is the necessity   for strict term limits for the Fed Chairmanship.  It is a disservice on   many levels when one individual so completely dominates policy and public   discourse, especially over a lengthy period.  This is especially true   for Fed Chairmen that – in “good times” – lack sufficient oversight and   effective checks and balances.  Then, when boom turns bust, we will be   faced with the dilemma of politicians meddling in monetary management.     When   it comes to asset Bubbles, it is incumbent upon the Federal Reserve to   endeavor to identify them early and have effective tools to temper Credit and   speculative excess as early in the boom process as possible.  The Fed’s   first mandate must be to maintain financial stability over the short, intermediate   and long-term.  Such a mandate cannot escape the challenging task of   monitoring excesses and implementing disciplinary measures to repress   behavior at odds with long-term system stability.   I   suggest that the most important Lesson to be Learned from the Greenspan Era   is the necessity for the Federal Reserve to regulate Credit, both liquidity   extended throughout the real economy as well as leveraging within the   financial sector.  There is today no appreciation that an Unfettered   Financial Sphere is incompatible with effectively functioning pricing   mechanisms throughout the Economic Sphere. Additionally, asset inflation,   Current Account Deficits, and over-liquefied speculative markets should be   recognized as primary contemporary indications of loose monetary conditions   (minimal “core-CPI” notwithstanding).  Policymakers must also take a   cautious approach to financial innovation, certainly including major changes   in the nature of financial institutions and intermediation, instruments,   market processes and practices.    Mr.   Greenspan is heralded for his early recognition of changes in the real   economy (the so-called productivity boom) that he and others presumed   afforded the Fed ample slack to accommodate accelerated growth.  Yet   profound Financial Sphere developments - and with them greater marketplace   liquidity, Credit Availability and attendant speculative proclivities -   beckoned for restraint.  The Greenspan legacy should rest upon his   failure to effectively manage financial innovation, along with his weakness   and incapacity for ever taking away the punchbowl.  He has left many   things, including his replacement, in most unenviable positions.  |